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Foreword 
Our energy systems, and in particular our electricity systems, in Ireland and 
Europe are undergoing almost revolutionary change at present. This has been 
driven by the need to address climate challenges, developments in generation 
technology and the increasing application of information and communications 
to the sector.  
At the same time, energy remains central to the operation of our economy. 
The policy goals shared by Ireland and the EU of access to secure, sustainable 
and, from a global competitiveness perspective, affordable energy have not 
changed.    
In relation to electricity, the key energy vector for the future, the EU has 
decided that it should be delivered on a competitive basis and has set down 
the general rules for this. The intention is to make electricity as competitive 
as possible, but there are major risks if the design is flawed. 
These developments open up a whole new vista for those involved in the 
sector and, for me, make it a hugely interesting area to research.  
Interconnection is one important aspect of a competitive electricity market.  
Interconnection is costly but justified based on modelling of the costs and 
benefits it delivers. The research area chosen examined the assumptions 
underpinning electricity interconnection in the specific context of the all-island 
market (The Single Electricity Market, SEM) and the electricity market of 
Great Britain (The British Electricity and Transmission Arrangements, BETTA).  
The purpose was to answer the questions: Have the expected benefits been 
delivered and, if different from expected what has caused this? Are there 
implications for future interconnection or market design?  
Getting the design wrong will have major implications in terms of consumer 
prices, economically efficient electricity trading and, as a consequence of 
both, overall economic development on the island. 
The study is, by its nature, open-ended as no decisions have been taken as 
yet in relation to the re-design of the Single Electricity Market (SEM).  More 
iv 
 
detailed analysis, involving application of the PLEXOS model could add further 
insights but has not been undertaken due to the limited time available.  
I would like to thank the following people who contributed to the completion 
of this research; 
 My Supervisor, Dr. Martin Barrett for his support and encouragement 
during this project. At many stages in the course of this research 
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ideas. His careful feedback contributed enormously to the production of 
this thesis. 
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would like to thank them for their immense generosity with their time. 
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feedback. 
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Glossary of Terms 
AI, All Island; This term shall be used throughout the document to describe 
the All Island electricity system which combines the systems in the Republic 
of Ireland and Northern Ireland 
AMP, The Auction Management Platform is a computerised system that 
provides the necessary mechanisms and outputs to facilitate trading across 
Moyle and EWIC. 
BETTA, British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements 
BSC, Balance and Settlement Code 
CER, Commission for Energy Regulation 
CPF, Carbon Price Floor 
EIL, Eirgrid Interconnector Ltd. 
EU, European Union 
EWIC, East West Interconnector 
FTR, Financial Transmission Right 
GB, Great Britain 
IA, Interconnector Administrator 
MIL, Moyle Interconnector Limited 
Ofgem, Office of Gas and Electricity Markets 
PCR, Price Coupling of Regions initiative 
PTR, Physical Transmission Right 
ROI, Republic of Ireland 
SEM, Single Electricity Market 
SO, System Operator 
SMP, System Marginal Price 
SONI, System Operator Northern Ireland 
TSO, Transmission System Operator 
UR, Utility Regulator, Regulates the electricity and gas markets in Northern 
Ireland 
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Abstract 
Economic trading across electricity interconnectors is considered to be a key 
factor in delivering the economic welfare benefits of an integrated European 
electricity market.  This research examines this assumption as it applies to 
the interconnection between the electricity markets in Ireland, Northern 
Ireland and Great Britain.  In doing so it reviews the assumption of 
economically rational trading behaviour by participants in the market.  This 
assumption underpinned the cost benefit studies justifying construction of the 
East-West interconnector.  Actual patterns of trading that have arisen post 
commissioning are compared with projected rational behaviour. 
The research also considers the consequences of these behavioural 
differences for the Single Electricity Market re-design project which the 
Regulatory Authorities on the island are undertaking at present. 
The analysis relies on an evaluation and examination of the trading patterns 
of different operators in the market and also on interviews with selected 
participants. It concludes that a simple assumption of economically rational 
behaviour based on apparent price differences between markets can be 
misleading given a range of other commercial risks apply in the real world. 
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1 Introduction 
By removing barriers and setting fair rules for cross-border exchanges in 
electricity, the EU plans to forge a competitive and transparent wholesale 
electricity market with a high level of security of supply that serves the 
interests of electricity consumers and increases the welfare of European 
citizens (SEM Committee, 2012). 
Across Europe, national energy policies are being shaped by the European 
Internal Energy Market. The ultimate goal of the European Internal Energy 
Market is a situation where consumers in any member state can purchase 
their energy from any supplier in the European Union (EU).  
A ‘Target Market Model’ has been designed to facilitate compatible cross 
border trading arrangements between Member States and all Member States 
are required to comply with this model by 2014. 
Owing to its centralised structure and gross mandatory pool design the 
magnitude of change required for the SEM to implement the target model is 
considerably greater than other markets in Europe (SEM Committee, 2012). 
For this reason a two year transitional period has been provided. The revised 
SEM, which must be implemented by 2016, is currently being referred to as 
Figure 1.1 Three maps showing the move from traditional national energy markets to 
intermediary regional markets and finally to the EU’s ultimate goal of a pan-European 
market, Source (EMCC) 
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the Integrated Single Electricity Market, I-SEM. According to the SEM 
Committee established to oversee the transition, I-SEM should facilitate more 
efficient trade across borders and further serve to bring together electricity 
prices across the two islands (Ireland and GB) and the wider EU.  
The infrastructure necessary to facilitate this trade is referred to as 
interconnection.  
By offering cross border access to market participants, interconnection has 
the potential to increase competitiveness and commercial opportunities; 
ensure greater security of supply; provide important ancillary services such as 
frequency response, reactive power and black start capability in addition to 
theoretically facilitating growth in renewable energy. 
‘Without interconnection, Ireland will not participate in the internal market, 
but instead be characterised as a small closed electricity system catering for a 
few million people and a smaller number of businesses (Gorecki, 2011).’ 
However, the theory which describes the welfare benefits of Interconnection is 
based on a number of assumptions which may not reflect the unfolding 
reality. This study will examine how the reality has diverged from these 
assumptions and what impact that has had on expected results. 
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1.1 Research Background and Context  
This section offers an introduction to three areas that are key to 
understanding the context of this study. First the theory behind 
interconnection will be presented, next the infrastructure necessary to 
facilitating interconnection will be described and finally, an overview of the 
two connected markets in question will be presented.  
1.1.1 Theoretical Rationale for Interconnection 
1.1.1.1 Economic Welfare Benefits 
At its simplest level, the theory of cross-border electricity trade is broadly 
similar to that of international trade in general. 
The following simple two-node example illustrates how trade between two 
countries should theoretically increase overall welfare.  
Figure 1.2 illustrates the supply and demand curves for two countries before 
trade. 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Supply Demand Curves for two theoretical electricity markets before 
interconnection, Adapted from (Turvey, 2006) 
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Before trade, the price equilibrium in country A is PA, which is lower than PB, 
the marginal price of electricity in country B. The theory of interconnection 
assumes that the cost of production of electricity is therefore lower in country 
A and thus more efficient.  
In this example, a cross-border electricity interconnector with capacity K is 
constructed and country B imports quantity K of electricity from country A. 
The result is a fall in price in country B to PB*, while in A, the marginal cost of 
generation rises due to increased production resulting in a rise in the price of 
electricity for consumers in A from PA to PA* as illustrated in Figure 1.3.  
 
Figure 1.3 Illustration of Impact of interconnection on marginal price in country A 
and B, Adapted from (Turvey, 2006) 
 
Examining figure 1.4 we can see that there has been a total loss of consumer 
surplus in country A of area (a + b). Producers in Country A however now 
have access to a wider market and we can observe that as a result, there 
have been producer gains of (a + b+ c). As producer gain is greater than 
consumer loss, it is stated that there is a net welfare gain from 
Interconnection for country A of area (c). 
5 
 
In country B there has been a loss of producer surplus of (d), but a gain in 
consumer surplus of area (d + e + f); there is thus a net welfare gain of (e + 
f) for country B. 
So while there is redistribution of a, b and d between the consumers and 
producers of the two countries, there is overall, a net welfare gain from trade 
of (c + e + f). 
 
 
Figure 1.4 Illustration of theoretical net impact of interconnection on welfare, 
adapted from (Turvey, 2006) 
 
The interconnector provider in this example gains rents for use of the 
interconnector of (PB* - PA*) x K. 
It is generally accepted that the incremental benefits of interconnection 
decrease with each subsequent interconnector (EirGrid, 2009) 
This example highlights the reason why individual Member States may be for 
or against increased interconnection, depending on their original wholesale 
electricity prices and those of potential trading partners. However, the 
European Commission (EC) sees the potential for net welfare gains for the EU 
as a whole. As a central body, the EC is in a freer position to advocate trade 
however Individual Member States, in particular national regulatory 
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authorities (NRAs) who generally have duties to protect the interest of 
consumers within their respective countries, may not be keen to see 
consumer prices rise if they are in the country where production costs are 
initially lower (Jacottet, 2012). 
1.1.1.2 Additional Welfare Effects of Interconnection 
Interconnection has the potential to offer a range of benefits in addition to the 
direct economic welfare benefits outlined above. The following benefits are 
commonly referred to in the literature; 
1. Enhanced Security of Supply 
2. Provision of ancillary services such as frequency response, reactive 
power and black start capability 
3. Promotion of competition 
4. Facilitation of Renewable Generation 
5. Reduction in required operating reserve. 
These benefits, combined with the potential for direct economic welfare gains 
(illustrated in section 1.1.1.1) broadly speaking explain the motivation for 
interconnection of the SEM and BETTA electricity markets. 
As wholesale electricity prices in the SEM have historically been higher than 
GB, Irish consumers are positioned to gain most from Interconnection 
according to this theory. 
1.1.2 All Island Current and Future Installed Interconnector Capacity 
The island of Ireland is connected to Great Britain by two High Voltage DC 
(HVDC) submarine interconnectors; The East-West Interconnector and The 
Moyle Interconnector.  Combined, they represent approximately 10% of all-
island electricity demand (EirGrid Group, 2013). GB is further connected to 
mainland Europe via the 1000 MW BritNed Interconnector to the Netherlands 
and the 2000 MW IFA Interconnector to France. 
1.1.2.1 The Moyle Interconnector 
The Moyle Interconnector owned and managed by Moyle Interconnector Ltd. 
(part of Northern Irish company Mutual Energy), commenced commercial 
operation in 2002. It comprises a dual monopole HVDC link with two coaxial 
sub-sea cables from Ballycronan More in Islandmagee, Northern Ireland to 
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Auchencrosh in Ayrshire, Scotland (EirGrid & SONI, 2013). The link has a 
physical installed capacity of 500MW. Moyle originally had an import capacity 
of 450 MW and an export capacity of 295 MW, however a fault on one of the 
cables has reduced this to 250 MW in both directions since 2012. Issues with 
transmission access rights in Scotland may further limit its export capacity to 
80 MW from 2017 (Eirgrid & SONI, 2014).  
1.1.2.2 The East-West Interconnector 
The East-West Interconnector links converter stations at Rush North Beach, 
Dublin with Barkby Beach in North Wales. The Interconnector, developed, 
owned and managed by EirGrid Interconnector Ltd. (EIL) and co-financed by 
the EU has been in full commercial operation since May 2013, and has the 
capability of importing or exporting up to 500 MW at any given moment. It is 
not easy to predict whether or not imports for the full 500 MW will be 
available at all time however and EirGrid has estimated the capacity value of 
the interconnector to be 440 MW in their most recent generation adequacy 
study (EirGrid & SONI, 2014). EWIC uses Voltage Source Converter (VSC) 
technology and is the largest capacity VSC interconnector in operation 
worldwide (EirGrid, 2014). The East West Interconnector represents an 
investment of approximately €580 million. EirGrid were granted a loan of up 
to €300 million from the European Investment Bank and the balance of the 
project was funded by a combination of further capital investment from 
commercial banks, EirGrid equity and a €110 million grant from the European 
Commission (CER, 2012). 
1.1.2.3 Proposed Interconnection 
A number of studies have attempted to project how much further 
interconnection is viable and of benefit to the SEM. This issue will be 
discussed further in the literature review. At present however, any plans for 
additional interconnection are still in the preliminary phase.   
In 2013, EirGrid and its French counterpart RTE (Réseau de Transport 
d’Électricité) signed a Memorandum of Understanding to begin preliminary 
studies on the feasibility of building a submarine electricity interconnector 
between Ireland and France. An Ireland-France interconnector would, if 
developed, run between the South coast of Ireland and the North West coast 
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of France.  According to a Press Release from Eirgrid in June 2013, the 
capacity of the Ireland-France interconnector could be approximately 700 MW 
(EirGrid, 2013). 
1.1.2.3.1 Interconnection infrastructure exclusively for Export of 
Renewables  
Several developers have proposed large-scale renewable energy export 
projects in Ireland that would access the GB market by connecting directly to 
its transmission system via one or more High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) 
links (National Grid & EirGrid, 2013). These proposed projects have however 
come up against a number of obstacles and their status is currently unknown. 
A number of studies have explored the benefits of connecting Irish renewable 
energy projects to GB via an integrated network solution. A 2013 joint EirGrid 
- National Grid study reported the estimated annual benefits of such a project 
to be €75m per annum. At present however this type of connection does not 
fit into the existing regulatory framework for either GB or Ireland (National 
Grid & EirGrid, 2013). 
 
1.1.3 SEM Vs. BETTA: High level overview 
While the theory behind interconnection is relatively simple, the fundamental 
differences between the SEM and BETTA markets presents a significant 
challenge to optimising trade over the Moyle and East West Interconnectors. 
The Single Electricity Market (SEM) is the wholesale electricity market 
operating on the island of Ireland. It operates as a gross mandatory pool 
market, into which all electricity generated on or imported onto the island of 
Ireland must be sold, and from which all wholesale electricity for consumption 
on or export from the island of Ireland must be purchased (EirGrid, 2014) 
The British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements (BETTA) is the 
wholesale electricity market operating in Great Britain. It operates as a 
bilateral trading market between generators, suppliers and energy traders. 
There are also power exchanges available in Great Britain which facilitate 
further trade in the BETTA market (EirGrid, 2014). 
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The key differences with respect to bidding, pricing, price visibility and 
capacity payments between the SEM and BETTA markets are summarised in 
figure 1.2. 
 
Figure 1.5 Comparison of the components of SEM and BETTA (EirGrid & SONI, 2014) 
Chapter three will go into further detail on the difference between the SEM 
and BETTA, however two of the key differences with respect to economic 
trade across the interconnection will be highlighted here given their 
significance. These are; 
1. Real Time Price Firmness: A consequence of the SEM design is that the 
final System Marginal Price, paid to generators, and by suppliers, is not 
known until four days after trading. This presents a high level of risk for 
anybody trading between the SEM and other markets. In interviews 
with Interconnector Users, the SMP was described as being ‘notoriously 
hard to predict’. 
2. Capacity Payment Regime: In accordance with SEM regulations, 
capacity payments are provided to imported electricity but deducted 
from exports to GB. There is currently no capacity payment mechanism 
in place in GB. 
3. Gate Window Closures: As will be explained in Chapter 3, in the SEM 
there are just three opportunities for market participants submit data 
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to the market operators for use in the associated marginal price 
software run. Two gate closures occur occur the day before trading 
(each closing 90 minutes before the relevant software run) and one 
gate closure occurs on the day of trading, 90 minutes before the Within 
Day software run. Gate closures occur on an hourly basis in GB. 
1.2 Research Selection Rationale 
Interconnectors are a key part of the physical infrastructure that is required in 
order to deliver the concept of a single Internal Electricity Market in the EU.  
The value of interconnection is based on assumptions regarding their use, 
including that of rational economic behaviour by those trading.   
Studies supporting the East-West interconnector in advance of its construction 
projected a positive benefit for consumers in Ireland.  It is of value to review 
the actual results against those projected and identify the possible causes for 
differences form original projections.  It is also of interest to examine if the 
reasons for these differences may also have implications or the redesign of 
the SEM. 
 
1.3 Main Aims and Key Objectives 
1.3.1 Key Objectives 
There are three key aims to this study. They are listed with their associated 
objectives below: 
 
 
 
 
 
Aims Objectives 
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Table 1.1 Thesis aims and associated objectives. 
 
 
1.4 Dissertation Scope and Limitations 
This study examines electricity flows on the Moyle and East-West 
interconnectors and the behaviour of those engaged in trading.  It utilises 
publicly available data to determine these.  The study also researched 
1. Examine interconnector flows 
between the SEM/All-island (AI) 
and BETTA markets 
1a. Collect, organise and analyse SEMO 
Interconnector Flow Data to identify trends in 
volumes and direction over time and by type of 
trade. 
1b. Identify trading patterns and strategies of 
Interconnector Users 
2. Determine  whether the actual 
utilisation of the interconnectors; 
corresponds with pre-
interconnector delivery projections; 
2a. Compare findings with assumptions 
underpinning previous studies. 
2b. Assess whether EWIC is reducing SMP 
2c. Assess whether EWIC is helping us to achieve 
renewable targets 
3. Consider the reasons for any 
variances that have arisen under 
the current SEM market 
arrangements and what lessons 
can be provided in terms of 
developing the revised I-SEM 
market 
3a. Analyse results and determine whether there is 
a connection between the difference in assumed 
trading patterns and the differences in results. 
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opinions form those actively engaged in trading on the interconnector and the 
East-West interconnector operator. 
Data analysis was therefore necessarily limited to that available.  It would 
have been of interest to undertake a number of modelling runs using the 
modelling tool (PLEXOS) used originally to assess the interconnector benefits 
with modified assumptions in the light of actual experience.  In the absence of 
this the results and conclusions are more qualitative. 
While interviews were conducted with a number of individuals the sample was 
not fully representative of all parties trading on the interconnector.  As a 
result it has the potential to be biased although enquiries were constructed to 
minimise this possibility.     
The scope of work that could be undertaken was also limited by the time 
available; some sections of the analysis could only be applied to one month 
given time restrictions, analysis of a longer time period would have offered 
more comprehensive results. 
1.5 Dissertation Structure 
This dissertation is divided into seven chapters.  
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the research topic including the policy 
background, rationale for electricity trading, market structures in Ireland (AI) 
and Great Britain and the current status of interconnection between the 
markets in both regions. 
Chapter 2 present a literature review of key aspects of this study including 
materials pre and post completion of the East-West interconnector.   
Chapter 3 describes in more detail the design of the markets in Ireland and 
Northern Ireland (SEM) and Great Britain (BETTA) and the arrangements for 
trading across the interconnectors. 
Chapter 4 examines the possible implications for interconnector trading of 
upcoming changes to the SEM, which are intended to improve the economic 
efficiency of such trading. 
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Chapter 5 describes the methodology used in researching this thesis and 
identifies the data sources and approximations used to determine results. 
The results and discussion are presented in Chapter 6.  These compare the 
projected behaviours anticipated before construction of the East-West 
interconnector with those observed subsequently.  The implications for the 
restructured SEM are also addressed. 
Chapter 7 presents the conclusions of this thesis, describe the degree to 
which the original objectives were achieved and indicates possible further 
areas for study. 
 
1.6 Original Contribution 
The following analyses constitute work the author has not found to be 
previously published;  
- Disaggregation of trading on the GB-SEM interconnectors. 
- Identification and classification of trading behaviours across the 
Moyle and East West Interconnectors. 
- Analysis of the differences between forecasted and actual trading 
behaviours across the Moyle and East West Interconnectors. 
- Analysis of possible implications resulting from this behavioural 
difference for the development of I-SEM. 
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2 Literature Review 
This literature review will focus on a number of key aspects that will support a 
proper understanding of the relevant factors relating to this research topic of 
Interconnection between the SEM and its neighbouring countries, including 
the basis on which it was justified, it’s projected and actual impact on 
wholesale prices and its ability to facilitate renewables. 
Note that a review of the relevant literature associated with the following 
topics has been undertaken and referenced in the relevant chapters; 
 General Theory of Interconnection (Chapter 1) 
 Trading Across the Interconnector; The Fundamentals (Chapter X) 
 The Integrated European Electricity Market (Chapter X) 
 Barriers to Trade and ability of proposed I-SEM Changes to Address 
them (Chapter X –includes review of I-SEM Consultation responses) 
As such, these topics are not repeated here. 
In addition to researching literature specifically related to interconnection and 
the SEM, this review is also informed by related international research so as 
to provide a broader context to this work.  
2.1 Economic Welfare Gains from Interconnection in the SEM 
2.1.1 Analysis prior to EWIC Project Completion 
In the years preceding the East West Interconnector Project, several reports 
examining the impact of increased interconnection on production costs and 
electricity prices in the SEM were published. These reports broadly agreed 
that the proposed 500 MW of interconnection would have the effect of 
reducing the wholesale price of electricity in the SEM but results diverged on 
the extent of the reduction and on the impact of further interconnection after 
EWIC on economic welfare in the SEM. 
Valari (2008) projected the effects of additional interconnection between 
Ireland and GB using a static optimal dispatch model in a study published by 
the ESRI. The analysis was based on 2005 fuel prices and generation plant 
mix and assumed perfect competition in wholesale generation markets. As the 
basic theory of Interconnection would predict, Valeri found that in general, 
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‘Ireland enjoys larger net benefits than Great Britain with interconnection’ 
(Valeri, Working Paper No. 232, 2008). In all scenarios considered she found 
that Irish consumers were always the group that gained the most and Irish 
producers the group that lost the most. 
Again, consistent with Interconnector Theory, the sum of Irish and British 
social welfare was found to increase with interconnection, although at a 
decreasing rate. Table 2.1 summarises the annual welfare changes for the 
Interconnector owner and consumers and producers in GB and Ireland that 
were predicted by Valeri’s model for various incremental increases in installed 
interconnector capacity. 
Table 2.1 Annual welfare changes in million euro, 2005 prices, Source (Valeri, 
Working Paper No. 232, 2008) 
 
The following year, EirGrid conducted their own Economic Feasibility Report to 
assess the costs and benefits of further interconnection to GB or France. Their 
results forecast that the East-West interconnector would bring production cost 
savings in the range €50-€75 million in 2025 and that an additional 500 MW 
interconnector would bring production cost savings in the range of €25 – 50 
million. A High Renewables generation portfolio resulted in the greatest 
savings from additional interconnection in this report. 
EirGrid’s results showed that marginal prices on the island of Ireland would be 
reduced by the addition of smaller amounts of interconnection to the system 
(500 MW), however, with more interconnection, the picture was mixed and 
EirGrid stated it was ‘difficult to draw a conclusion’. The only results presented 
with respect to marginal price in this report were estimated marginal price in 
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€/MWh for the Base Case scenario for the year 2015. These results were only 
presented in graphical form, however we can read from the graph reproduced 
in Figure 2.1 that when 500 additional megawatts are added to an existing 
installed 500 MW (representing Moyle), Marginal price drops from 
approximately 61 €/MWh to 60.28 €/MWh. Thus we can infer that the 2009 
EirGrid feasibility study projected a drop in marginal price of just 1.2% 
attributable to the increased 500 MW East West Interconnector. 
 
Figure 2.1Effect of additional interconnection on marginal price in 2015, Original 
graph (EirGrid, 2009), lines representing 500 MW and 1000 MW added to illustrate 
impact of Moyle and East West Interconnectors.  
In the same year, Pöyry Energy Consulting included an Interconnection 
Sensitivity Analysis as part of their multi-client study ‘Implications of 
Intermittency’.  
A ‘Base Case’ scenario with one interconnector (Moyle) at 400 MW import and 
export capacity and a second interconnector (the proposed EWIC) at 1 GW 
was compared with a ‘Lower Interconnection’ scenario where export on Moyle 
was reduced to 80 MW and EWIC capacity was reduced to 500 MW both ways. 
The impact on GB prices was negligible, however the modelling predicted 200 
more periods annually of zero or negative prices and 400 more periods of €0 
– 20/ MWh prices in the SEM in the core scenario when compared with the 
‘lower interconnection’ scenario. Overall, monthly and annual prices in the 
500 MW 
1000 MW  
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SEM were found to be 1% higher in 2015 and 5.3% higher in 2025 in the 
‘lower interconnection’ scenario. The report asserted that this was the result 
of ‘stranded wind’.  These results do not tally with EirGrid’s 2015 projections 
presented in Figure 2.1 which indicate a drop in marginal price of just 0.3% 
when AI-GB interconnector capacity is increased beyond 900 MW. 
The assumptions underlying all three of these reports have been challenged. 
Both the ESRI and the Pöyry studies assumed perfectly functioning 
interconnectors at full capacity and EirGrid’s study assumed flows when there 
were price differences at both ends of the interconnector. However, a SEM 
Committee paper ‘Short to Medium Term Interconnector Issues in the SEM’ 
produced later that year indicated that these assumptions did not reflect 
reality. 
This SEM paper was prompted partly by a perception that use of the Moyle 
Interconnector had changed significantly after the market restructuring which 
occurred in November 2007 and partly by a concern that the rules governing 
its use were contributing to security of supply concerns. The paper recognised 
that flows in both directions across Moyle had not responded as fully as they 
might have to price arbitrage opportunities between the SEM and BETTA and 
identified a number of reasons why this might be the case. These issues 
included the availability of capacity on Moyle and its cost, the risks created by 
the misalignment of the SEM and BETTA (e.g. gate closure and ex-post 
pricing), the lack of liquidity in the day ahead markets and network charging 
in GB (SEM Committee, 2009).  
While the addition of 500 MW of installed interconnector capacity helped 
address the availability issue highlighted in this report and some progress has 
been made in terms of regulatory changes, for example, the introduction of a 
‘within day’ gate window, many of the fundamental issues hindering economic 
use of the interconnector raised in this paper persist.  
Denny et al. (2010) also found that an increase in interconnection should 
reduce average price, this time, in a context of high penetration of wind. The 
results published in the journal Energy Policy in a paper entitled ‘The Impact 
of Increased Interconnection on Electricity Systems with Large Penetrations of 
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Wind Generation: A case study of Ireland and Great Britain’ also suggested 
that increased interconnection would reduce price variability in this context. 
This study utilized a stochastic unit commitment model to simulate the 
impacts of increased interconnection for the island of Ireland with large 
penetrations of wind generation. A number of scenarios were modelled. The 
base case assumed 1000 MW of interconnection, Scenario 1 assumed an 
increase to 2000 MW coupled with a significant increase in wind penetration 
on the GB system (representing a growth in wind in similar proportion to that 
assumed in the Irish system). Scenario three modelled the impact of intra-day 
trading on the interconnector, with an installed capacity of 2000 MW. 
The results of the price analysis are indicated in table 2.2 below. 
Table 2.2 Average SMP results from Denny et al 2010 study, Source (Denny, et al., 
2010) 
 
By operating the interconnectors intra-day, the day-ahead prices were 
reduced slightly while the intra-day prices in Ireland were significantly 
decreased. This was due to being able to use the interconnectors instead of 
more expensive peaking units to make up for wind power forecast errors, or 
unit outages. The variability of prices was also significantly reduced (Denny, 
et al., 2010) 
 
2.1.2 Analysis Post EWIC Project Completion 
Limited analysis of the impact of the Moyle and EWIC on wholesale price post 
completion of the East West Interconnector has been published. 
In Section 6.4 of the All-Island Generation Capacity Statement 2014-2023 
published February 2014, results of a study carried out by SEMO are 
presented. 
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The study examined the first six months of EWIC operation, effectively 
rerunning the market schedule for those months and graphing the differential 
with and without EWIC in full operation. The results are presented in Figure 
2.2 below.  
According to this analysis, on average EWIC reduced the SMP by 4 €/ MWh, or 
8%, for those months (Eirgrid & SONI, 2014). A result substantially higher 
than the 1.4% difference projected for 2015 in EirGrid’s original Feasibility 
Report (see figure 2.1).  
The report did not include the study methodology. 
 
Figure 2.2Results for Load weighted SMP for May - Oct 2013 with and without EWIC 
as presented in the 2014 All-Island Generation Capacity Statement, Source (Eirgrid & 
SONI, 2014) 
 
In April 2014, EirGrid conducted their own analysis of EWIC’s impact on 
overall production costs and SMP. These are the only studies of the impact of 
either the Moyle or East West Interconnector on wholesale price to be 
undertaken post project completion.  
The results were presented in a press release in April 2014, which reported 
that, for the duration of their analysis, there had been an overall 9% 
reduction in SMP.  Again, this is a substantially greater reduction than pre 
project projections 
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Figure 2.3 Press Release Issued by Eirgrid, Source (EirGrid, 2014) 
 The analysis was based on a comparison of a base case ‘EWIC ON’ scenario 
representing EWIC being fully available from May 1st 2013 to April 1st 2014 
with an ‘EWIC OFF’ scenario representing an unconnected AI market for the 
same period. 
The EWIC ON base case scenario was built using actual Unconstrained Unit 
Commitment (UUC) EP2 Gate Window data. Within the Central Market System 
the unconstrained unit commitment functionality automatically identifies the 
units, placing them in their relevant market order according to a bid price per 
MW and production costs as well as demand through the Trading day (SEMO, 
2014). 
A theoretical UUC was built for the EWIC OFF scenario and overall production 
cost and SMP were compared. 
The study analysed economic dispatch only i.e. constraints, reserves or 
otherwise were not considered. The results showed reductions in production 
cost and relative average daily savings in SMP of 5.85 €/MWh or 9% on 
average over the period studied. 
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Figure 2.4 EirGrid 2014 Analysis Results, Load Weighted Average SMP May 1st 2013 - 
April 30th 2014, Source (Campbell, 2014) 
To date, no independent analysis of the impact of the EWIC interconnector on 
production costs or wholesale price based on real data has been published. 
The assumptions underlying the above study will be further explored in 
Chapter 6. 
2.2 Renewables 
Many commentators have highlighted the potential for interconnection to 
facilitate the integration of wind generation in power systems by increasing 
system flexibility and balancing variable wind output. 
Indeed, a fundamental assumption underlying all of the aforementioned ‘Pre 
EWIC’ studies and several subsequent publications is that wind is a driving 
factor of interconnector flows. Models have been based on the assumption 
that increased interconnection will allow Ireland to export wind during high 
wind periods and import power from Britain when wind levels are low, with 
implications for renewable subsidies, security of supply and renewables 
targets. 
Goreki (2011) in his analysis of the implications of the EU Electricity market in 
Ireland, reminds us that ‘an additional motive for building interconnection is 
to utilise wind generated electricity in an optimal manner……  In order to 
ensure wind is not unduly curtailed off the system, interconnection is of vital 
importance (Gorecki, 2011)’. 
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Figure 2.5 shows Pöyry’s projections for interconnector flows and wind 
generation in the Irish market for 2030. The flows represented in Figure 2.5 
are highly responsive to changing wind output. 
 
Figure 2.5 Pöyry results, Interconnection flows between markets and wind 
generation in the Irish market (2030, weather of 2001) Source, (Pöyry Energy 
Consulting, 2009) 
With respect to renewables, the Pöyry study found that more wind curtailment 
would occur in its ‘lower interconnection’ scenario, with the number of trading 
periods of wind loss in Ireland increasing from 61 to 222 in 2020 and from 
723 to 1,177 in 2030 by comparison with the core scenario. This would lead 
to higher carbon emission in the SEM.  The Pöyry study concludes that 
interconnection between Britain and the SEM becomes of critical importance 
as the volume of installed wind generation increases; observing that the 
larger the geographical area that installed wind is spread over, the more 
constant and less intermittent the wind generation becomes. 
In EirGrid’s 2008 business case for the Interconnector, Environmental benefits 
with respect to wind curtailment were valued at €10 million per annum and 
the likelihood that these full benefits would arise, based on the premise of 
33% renewable penetration, was reported at 100%. Environmental benefits 
with respect to reducing the need to carry reserve were valued at €2 million 
per annum; again with a 100% likelihood that the full benefit would arise. 
Environmental benefits associated with reduced carbon credit payment were 
valued at €28 million per annum with a 50% likelihood that the full benefit 
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would arise. These were based on annual total energy requirement figures 
which have transpired to be much lower than those projected to date.  
EirGrid’s 2009 Economic Feasibility Report reaffirmed that interconnection 
would reduce wind curtailment, stating that ‘a substantial proportion of the 
production cost savings derive from reducing wind curtailment on the island of 
Ireland’. 
Diffney et al, in their 2009 paper ‘Investment in electricity infrastructure in a 
small isolated market: the case of Ireland’ concluded that investment in 
interconnection is a sine qua non for high investment in wind, with the former 
allowing the latter to generate whenever it is available instead of being 
curtailed at times of low demand. The paper cautioned however that 
enhanced interconnection between the Irish and British systems must be 
managed in a manner that will maximise welfare gains, and noted that this 
issue had not been fully considered by policy makers at that time. 
The work of Denny et al. challenged prior studies on the issue of curtailment 
and emissions. This analysis factored into its model that interconnectors 
would be scheduled day-ahead, i.e. that operation would be based on 
forecasted values of load and wind output causing a non-optimal transmission 
schedule in some operational hours when there were large deviations from 
the day – ahead forecast.  
It was also acknowledged here that the ability to balance variable wind 
depends on the neighbouring system having spare flexibility, which is likely to 
be reduced if there is a large amount of wind in both systems. 
The results indicated that while increased interconnection improves system 
adequacy considerably, with a significant reduction in the number of hours 
when the load and reserve constraints are not met, and reduces the balancing 
needs for both systems, assuming that they cooperate in providing balancing 
reserves, it does not reduce excess wind generation. 
This was explained by the fact that under unit commitment techniques which 
incorporate wind power forecasts in the scheduling decisions, wind 
curtailment is minimal even with low levels of interconnection. 
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The overall wind production on the Irish system was relatively unchanged in 
all three scenarios (described in the previous section). Wind curtailment 
changed from a low level of 23 GWh per annum (0.12% of Irish wind 
production) in the base case to 30 GWh (0.15%) in scenarios 1 and 2. The 
cause of the slight increase in absolute terms was the interconnectors being 
scheduled day –ahead. 
The study also covered the impact of interconnection on GB, finding that while 
increased interconnection may reduce carbon emissions in Ireland, emissions 
in GB would not be reduced resulting in total emissions remaining almost 
unchanged although this conclusions does not reflect the impact of the EU-
wide Emissions Trading System (ETS) in fixing emission quantities.  
Curtis et al in their 2013 paper ‘Climate policy, interconnection and carbon 
leakage: the effects of unilateral UK policy on electricity and GHG emissions in 
Ireland’ have updated and built upon these findings although again ignoring 
the impact of the EU-wide ETS regime, demonstrating that interconnection 
enables carbon leakage, particularly if policies relating to the price of carbon 
are misaligned across countries. The authors used a model of the electricity 
markets in Ireland and GB to show that GB’s Carbon Price Floor would 
increase both electricity prices and greenhouse gas emissions in Ireland.  
Their results suggested the introduction of the CPF would make BETTA 
generators less competitive compared to the SEM and net exports from the 
SEM would increase by 154%. Regulations around the Carbon Floor have 
since been changed meaning these predictions are unlikely to be realised, 
however, the dramatic results expose the SEM’s vulnerability to changes in 
policy in GB. 
EirGrid continue to maintain that the interconnector is facilitating growth in 
renewable energy.  Their ‘East West Interconnector –One Year On’ report 
listed ‘Facilitating growth in renewable energy’ as one of five core benefits. 
However, it is possible that they are referring here primarily to TSO Counter 
Trading as opposed to facilitation of growth in renewable energy by  
commercial interconnector users. In their 2013 Renewables report, EirGrid 
group stated that the EWIC is facilitating the increased use of renewable 
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energy by helping to reduce the curtailment of renewables through the use of 
System Operator trades directly with National Grid Electricity Transmission 
(EirGrid Group, 2013) 
No analysis of the net contribution of the Interconnectors to the facilitation of 
renewable generation and reduction of emissions in the SEM based on real 
data has been published to date. 
 
2.3 Impact of Regulatory Decisions in GB on Interconnector Flows 
The findings of Curtis et al.’s 2013 paper discussed in section 2.2 indicated 
the vulnerability of the SEM market to changes in GB policy.  
While the impact of the carbon floor on interconnector flows was not as 
extreme as predicted on account of subsequent changes in policy, the ESRI 
have more recently published a report (Deane, FitzGerald, Valeri, Tuohy, & 
Walsh, 2014) that strongly suggests that the wholesale price in Great Britain 
is much lower than in Ireland and in fact too low to cover long run generating 
costs making it an unsustainable long-term model. 
The study which estimates true costs and price difference for the British 
model using the simulation tool PLEXOS, finds that the difference between 
wholesale prices in SEM and BETTA is not driven by technological factors. 
BETTA consists of firms that are, for the most part, vertically integrated and 
therefore have both a generating and a retail function. The study finds that 
firms in BETTA not making losses as a result of the low wholesale price, as 
they are compensated by large retail margins. This favours incumbents with 
established customer bases and makes entry of new generators difficult. 
It was also estimated that the cost of supporting renewables per MWh of 
electricity consumed is much higher in GB than in Ireland, even though 
renewables account for a smaller share of overall consumption. The report 
concluded that upward pressure on prices is likely in the future in both 
jurisdictions, as both aim to increase the share of renewables in electricity 
generation but that the disparity in subsidy costs across jurisdictions should 
gradually reduce in size. 
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In BETTA there has been a dearth of new thermal plants coming online, unlike 
the SEM where there has been extensive new entry with limited ad-hoc 
intervention by the regulatory authorities. The report suggests that to 
encourage new generating plants to come on board, incentives for investment 
in BETTA must grow, suggesting that the gap between SEM and BETTA 
wholesale prices will narrow in the future. Their conclusion that some form of 
remuneration for capacity is inevitable is supported by the literature and 
policy developments emerging from Ofgem with respect to GB Energy Market 
Reform. 
Changes in the wholesale price in GB and/ or the addition of a capacity 
payment mechanism are likely influence the ratio of imports to exports across 
the Moyle and East West Interconnector. 
2.4 Literature Review Conclusion 
As has been discussed, prior to the completion of EWIC several studies using 
a range of approaches were undertaken with a view to measuring and 
assessing the various impacts of interconnection on the SEM. 
It would appear that a number of the key assumptions that underpinned this 
body of work do not reflect the reality of trading since the completion of the 
EWIC. 
According to EirGrid’s own recent analysis, EWIC has been much more 
successful at reducing the wholesale price of electricity in Ireland than was 
originally anticipated. These results have however not been verified by 
independent research. This thesis will attempt to determine the margin of 
error for these results. 
As discussed, the net impact of the interconnectors on facilitation of 
renewables has not yet been formally analysed but the indication from 
industry responses to the SEM Committees various consultation documents is 
that the current system does not create conditions favourable for arbitrage 
trading –i.e. trading that can take advantage of short term price differences, 
including those as a result of wind. This would indicate that trading is not 
occurring as predicted in the original analyses. This thesis will attempt to 
characterise and assess the current patterns of trade across the Moyle and 
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East West Interconnector.  Understanding the trading behaviour of 
interconnector users should be a vital prerequisite to any future study of 
interconnector performance and impact. 
If it is found that these patterns are sub-optimal, this thesis will attempt to 
determine what the barriers to optimal trading are and which of the new 
options being proposed as part of I-SEM can best address them. 
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3 Trading Across the Interconnector; The 
Fundamentals 
This chapter will begin with an explanation of the SEM and BETTA markets. 
Their key differences with respect to interconnection are then assessed. 
In section 3.4 the process of trading over the interconnectors is outlined, this 
section draws from published guides to trading and using the Auction 
Management Platform, Access Agreements for the respective interconnectors 
and interviews with Market Participants. 
The allocation arrangements for Moyle and EWIC currently prescribe that 
transmission and energy markets are separated. The process of how physical 
transmission rights are auctioned and traded in advance of energy markets is 
explained. 
 
3.1 The SEM 
3.1.1 How does it work? 
The SEM is the wholesale market for the island of Ireland, regulated jointly by 
the Commission for Energy Regulation (CER) and its counterpart in Belfast, 
the Utility Regulator. It is structured as a compulsory pool market with 
capacity payments.  
The rules of the all-Island Single Electricity Market (SEM) are detailed in the 
Trading and Settlement Code (TSC) written by the regulatory authorities in 
Ireland.  
Under the code, all price making generators (with an installed capacity larger 
than 10 MW) must bid their short run costs into the pool. Electricity suppliers 
purchase electricity from the pool to cover their consumer’s demand for each 
half hour period throughout the day. 
Once generators have submit their bids to the Single Electricity Market 
Operator (SEMO), an initial software run is conducted to determine a Market 
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Schedule which forecasts the System Marginal Price (SMP) for each half hour 
trading period. 
The SMP, calculated by the Market Scheduling and Pricing (MSP) software is 
set by the most expensive generator required to meet supplier demand in a 
half hour trading period, as illustrated in figure 3.1. All generators who 
produce electricity in a trading period (that is, all generators including and to 
the left of the marginal plant in figure 3.1) receive the SEM pool price for that 
period, which for most generators is greater than their short term cost of 
producing electricity. Where generator bids are below the SMP, the difference 
between the price that generator bids into the pool (their short run marginal 
cost) and the final ‘System Marginal Price’ all successful generators are paid is 
referred to as the infra marginal rent. The infra marginal rent, also referred to 
as the uplift component allows a generator to cover its start-up costs. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Determining the SMP (CER, 2011) 
 
As wind generators do not consume fuel they have no short term costs and 
hence can bid a zero price to the SEM. As price takers in the SEM, they 
receive the SMP set by the most expensive generator for their output in that 
half hour trading period (Clifford & Clancy, 2011). 
There are five runs of the MSP Software in respect of each Trading Day; three 
runs: Ex-Ante One (EA1), Ex-Ante Two (EA2) and Within Day One (WD1) 
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prior to the end of the Trading Day and two after the trading day when 
accurate data has been received: Ex-Post Indicative (EP1) and Ex-Post Initial 
(EP2) (CER, 2013). 
The final SMP which is paid to generators and by suppliers is calculated by the 
final SMP software run EP2 which occurs four days after the trading date. The 
EP2 run which produces this figure accounts for real time factors such as 
changes in customer demand or wind generation (CER, 2011). This SMP is the 
energy component of the total cost of producing electricity. 
Other market payments are made to generators to ensure that the system 
has adequate generation capacity in to the future. These payments are called 
capacity payments. The capacity price and the market SMP price represent 
the average long term cost of producing electricity in the SEM (Clifford & 
Clancy, 2011). 
In order to maintain a safe and secure power system the Transmission 
System Operator (TSO) may have to deviate from the generation schedule 
created by the SEM. This creates additional costs to the system, called 
Dispatch Balancing Costs, commonly known as constraints costs (Clifford & 
Clancy, 2011). 
The SEM will require significant modifications to implement the Target Model. 
The magnitude of change required for the SEM to achieve this is considerably 
greater than most other markets in Europe. This is due to its centralised, 
gross mandatory pool design which differs in a number of key respects from 
the prevailing market design in most other European Member States 
(Northern Ireland Authority for Utility Regulation, 2013). 
 
3.1.2 Key Parties from an Interconnector Perspective 
The Trading and Settlement Code (TSC) describes how trading is carried out 
on the island of Ireland and includes rules around how trading should take 
place across the interconnectors within the SEM. 
The TSC refers to three main parties with respect to the Interconnector; The 
Interconnector Administrator (IA), The Market Operator (MO) and 
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Interconnector Units (IUs). The roles of these three parties with respect to the 
SEM are summarised below; 
1. The IA is responsible for the administration of trading between 
jurisdictions. The designated IA for EWIC and Moyle is the System 
Operator for Northern Ireland (SONi). 
As IA, SONi facilitates capacity allocation and energy trading on the 
interconnectors via the Auction Management Platform (AMP) which is 
compatible with both SEM and BETTA arrangements. The AMP is a 
computerised system that provides the necessary mechanisms and 
outputs to facilitate trading across Moyle and EWIC. The AMP is 
currently hosted by UNICORN systems in the Czech Republic. 
 
2. The MO represents any party or system that manages the market 
place. The Single Electricity Market Operator (SEMO) is the designated 
market operator for the All Island SEM. 
 
3. Interconnector Units (IUs) or Interconnector Users represent any party 
that trades on the interconnectors via the SEM. Each Interconnector 
User must register a single Interconnector Unit, which is the entity 
against which the user trades in capacity and energy. 
 
EirGrid and SONI are the respective System Operators for Ireland and 
Northern Ireland and the Commission for Energy Regulation (CER) and 
Northern Ireland Authority for Utility Regulation are the respective Energy 
Regulators. 
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Figure 3.2 Graphic of EWIC and Moyle Interconnector Stakeholders, Source (CER, 
2013) 
 
3.2 BETTA 
3.2.1 How does it work? 
The British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements (BETTA) is the 
wholesale electricity market operating in Great Britain.  
It operates as a bilateral trading market between generators, suppliers and 
energy traders. The trading process is summarised below. 
Futures and Forwards Market 
‘Over the counter’ bilateral trades between sellers and buyers constitute the 
majority of trading within the BETTA market.  
The Grid Trading Master Agreement is the standard contract on which BETTA 
trades are based. 
Power Exchange 
The Power Exchange gives electricity suppliers and customers the opportunity 
to fine tune their position as more accurate information becomes available 
about their demand requirements.  
Gate Closure 
The power exchange closes one hour before real time operation. This is 
known as gate closure. At this point, all participants must submit their final 
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physical notification of their forecast of expected demand or supply to the 
system operator. 
Following this, bids (to reduce generation or increase demand) and offers (to 
reduce demand or increase generation) can then be submitted to the System 
Operator (National Grid). 
Balancing Mechanism 
The balancing mechanism allows the System Operator to ensure that the 
systems balance during each half hour of real time operation. The bids and 
offers submitted at gate closure are used to achieve this. The Balancing 
Mechanism operates from gate closure until real time operation. Should a 
participant be out of balance at gate closure, they will be subject to the 
imbalance cash-out price. The penalties for imbalance are high and, as such, 
this mechanism is seen within the industry as a last resort (HM Revenue & 
Customs, 2012). 
Settlement 
Settlement takes place post real time operation. This is where the system 
operator calculates the participant’s settlement. 
 
Figure 3.3 Trading and Settlement Timeline following hourly Gate Closure (Elexon, 
2013) 
National Grid (NG) is the System Operator for GB and the Commission for 
Regulation and Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) acts as Energy 
Regulator. 
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3.2.2 Key Parties from an Interconnector Perspective 
The Balancing and Settlement Code (BSC) describes the trading arrangements 
for Great Britain and requires formal interfacing roles to be undertaken by the 
Interconnector Administrator (SONi, 2014). The company Elexon administers 
the BSC and provides and procures the services needed to implement it. 
Under the BSC, the IA (who is the same for both the SEM and BETTA) is 
responsible for the administration of trading between jurisdictions including 
management and settlement of IC power imbalances in GB.  
The IA must submit ‘Physical Notifications’ (PNs) to the Transmission 
Company on behalf of participants as well as submitting energy allocations to 
the Market Operator. 
 
3.3 SEM Vs BETTA; Summary of Market Differences 
3.3.1 Pricing and Price Visibility 
In the SEM, all generators and suppliers receive and pay the same wholesale 
price for electricity, the SMP. In BETTA, the price of power purchased through 
bilateral contracts is generally not disclosed. The price of power sold through 
power exchanges is set by the most expensive unit cleared, and these prices 
are publicly available (Eirgrid & SONI, 2014). 
In BETTA, participants know what price they will pay or receive for power in 
advance of delivery. In the SEM, the final price is calculated after actual 
power delivery to account for unforeseen changes such as generator failure, 
changes in wind or demand forecasts, etc. For this reason, participants do not 
know the final price until four days after the power has been delivered. 
3.3.2 Capacity Payments 
As outlined above, all generators in the SEM receive capacity payments based 
on their availability to run. Total payment each year is fixed by the regulators. 
Interconnector users importing into the SEM receive SMP and Capacity 
Payments based on flows. Interconnector Users exporting out from SEM pay 
SMP and Capacity Payments based on flows (Lawlor, 2012). Capacity 
payments do not exist in GB as of yet, and so these extra payments tend to 
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increase the price differential between the two markets, making it more 
attractive to import to the SEM from BETTA (Eirgrid & SONI, 2014). 
However, the British Government is attempting to deal with the issue of 
future supply shortages by promoting investment into electricity generation 
through an initiative known as ‘Electricity Market Reform’ (EMR). A key 
component of EMR is the introduction of a capacity market.  
The structure of these capacity payments is currently under consultation, and 
it is uncertain how this might affect trading between the two markets (Eirgrid 
& SONI, 2014). 
 
3.3.3 Generation by Fuel Type 
Figure 3.4 illustrates SEM and BETTA generation portfolio composition. 
 
Figure 3.4 Comparison of the generation in both regions by fuel type, Source: (Eirgrid 
& SONI, 2014) 
The most striking differences in plant portfolio between the two markets are 
1) BETTA’s higher proportion of coal plant and 2) their significant level of 
nuclear generation. The price of coal is currently low compared to gas, and 
nuclear power plants have a low short-run marginal cost. This tends to result 
in a lower cost of generating electricity in BETTA relative to the SEM. In 
addition, most gas in SEM is transported through the UK and as such is more 
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expensive, further increasing the difference in generation costs between the 
two regions (Eirgrid & SONI, 2014). 
3.3.4 Forecasting Future Flows 
As outlined in the literature review, prices in BETTA have to date on average 
been lower than those in the SEM, particularly once capacity payments are 
included. This is illustrated in Figure 3.5, which compares 2013 prices from 
the two regions. The price difference is negligible at night time and is most 
noticeable around the evening peak, when uplift tends to form a larger 
component of the SMP. 
 
Figure 3.5 Comparison of the SMP in SEM and APX prices (which represent the 
opportunity cost of power in BETTA) FOR 2013. SMP values are shown with and 
without capacity prices added on. Source: (Eirgrid & SONI, 2014) 
As outlined in the literature review, it is possible that this price difference may 
shrink over the coming years.  
The introduction of the Carbon Price Floor in Britain in 2013 is leading to 
increasing generation costs for fossil fuel power plants in BETTA. The closure 
of old plant and plant not compliant with emissions directions in the coming 
years may compound this. Deane et al. (2014) argue that the wholesale price 
in Great Britain is in fact too low to cover long run generating costs making it 
an unsustainable long-term model. 
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3.4 Trading Across the Interconnector 
3.4.1 Why and How to Trade Across the Interconnector 
In order to become an interconnector user, candidates must complete the 
User Agreement Form and Interconnector Administration Deed for the 
relevant interconnector. 
Additionally, they must register to trade in the SEM and BETTA and register 
with the Auction Management Platform (AMP) as well as registering for an 
Energy Identification Code which allows users trade within the different 
European energy markets. 
A list of all currently registered Interconnector Units is included in Appendix A. 
Broadly speaking, the EWIC and Moyle Interconnectors are used by 
participants in two ways. 
3.4.1.1 Hedging using Explicit Auctions 
Firstly, and most commonly, the interconnectors are used by participants to 
provide hedging opportunities for their existing portfolio positions in the SEM 
and BETTA market. 
In order to purchase and flow energy across the EWIC or Moyle 
interconnector, an IU must first purchase the right to flow that energy across 
the interconnector, this means buying capacity. Explicit Capacity auctions are 
held on the Auction Management Platform. The AMP is a computerised system 
that provides the necessary mechanism and outputs to facilitate trading 
across the interconnectors. Here market participants can purchase the right to 
utilise capacity on the interconnector from one day up to one year ahead of 
the delivery day. 
For example, an IU may purchase a seasonal product for a specified quantity 
of MW for October – March of the following year. This gives the IU the right to 
flow the agreed amount of electricity across the interconnector for that period 
of time.  
Once capacity has been secured, the user can then enter a contract to 
purchase or sell an agreed quantity of energy from the other market (either 
directly with another participant or via an anonymous platform in GB such as 
38 
 
Trayport) at a fixed price for a period in the future; thus reducing their 
exposure to future price fluctuations in the wholesale market.  
The ‘Capacity Products’ available via explicit auction are illustrated in Figure 
3.6.  
 
Figure 3.6 Explicit Auctions, Source (EirGrid, 2014) 
These ‘capacity products’ are auctioned throughout the year at predetermined 
dates. The tranches of capacity auctioned differ for each trading product and 
direction. A marginal pricing methodology is applied and all successful 
applicants pay the auction clearing price for capacity. 
The screenshot below illustrates what fictional auction participant ‘X_Trade’ 
would see following evaluation of an auction to flow energy across Moyle from 
Northern Ireland to GB from 6am on the 1st of September 2011 to 6am on the 
1st of October 2011. There were two participants in this auction and X_Trade 
made three of the four bids submitted; one for 40 MW at 1.20 GBP/ MWh, one 
for 50 MW at £1.10 /MWh, and one for 10 MW at £1.00 /MWh. The auction 
price was evaluated by the AMP system to be 1.10 GBP/ MWh and so the first 
bid was accepted, the second partially accepted and the third rejected. 
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Figure 3.7 Long-term Auction Bids –After Evaluation Auction, Source (UNICORN 
Systems, 2010) 
Figure 3.7 taken from the common FUI portal illustrates the overall results 
from an auction for ‘EWIC Monthly Import’ Capacity. The total allocated 
capacity for this auction was 50 MW. Seven participants bid a collective 
capacity of 342 MW; the price curve illustrates the spread of price quantity 
bids. The marginal price to meet the total allocated capacity of 50 MW was 
€8.13. The three successful applicants who had bid at or above this price paid 
the auction clearing price and secured the capacity. 
 
Figure 3.8 Auction Results Source (FUI, 2014) 
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3.4.1.2 Proprietary Trading and Implicit Auctions 
Capacity may also be purchased via Implicit Auctions. Implicit auctions allow 
market participants to purchase capacity and the associated energy on Moyle 
or the EWIC in one transaction for individual 30 minute interval periods of the 
trade day. 
These auctions are run by SEMO as part of the inter-day market runs (Ex Ante 
2 and Within-Day 1). Market participants submit price-quantity pairs directly 
to the SEM system. Unlike explicit auctions which are used for hedging 
purposes, trading at the EA2 and WD1 stage is done to capture real time price 
differences. This is referred to as ‘proprietary trading’ and is still relatively 
uncommon across the East West or Moyle Interconnector.  
 
Figure 3.9 Implicit Auctions, Source: (EirGrid, 2014) 
The EA1 run is not an auction for interconnector capacity. Market participants 
must however submit bid prices per trade interval to secure the energy 
corresponding to their explicit EWIC capacity holdings. 
Any residual capacity on the EWIC after the SEM Ex-Ante 1 run is made 
available to market participants in the subsequent EA2 intraday auction. This 
auction covers the full SEM trade day (06:00 – 06:00) (EirGrid, 2014).  
Any residual capacity on the EWIC after the SEM EA2 run is made available to 
market participants in the subsequent WD1 intraday auction. This auction 
covers a twelve hour period within the SEM trade day from 18:00 – 06:00 
(EirGrid, 2014).  
Given that the final SMP is not known until four days after trading day, 
participants engaging in this type of trading must have an understanding of 
how SMP is derived and an ability to estimate future spikes and troughs. 
There is less uncertainty around the wholesale price of electricity in GB. 
41 
 
An example of a company’s trading for one day (6:00 to 01:00 only shown 
due to space constraints) across multiple gate windows is illustrated in figure 
3.10. 
As shown, the Company had secured 100 MW of import capacity via explicit 
auction. Typically, once this capacity has been secured, the company will 
purchase the associated energy from an anonymous GB power exchange for 
the periods when they wish to use their capacity. This company used their full 
100 MW import capacity for every half hour period shown. The company will 
typically deliver this energy to a supply company in Ireland with whom they 
have a Contract for Difference. 
When the opportunity arose to purchase further capacity for certain half hour 
periods at the EA2 gate window, the company entered bids and secured 40 
MW import capacity and 120 MW export capacity. We can assume this was 
because the capacity was available cheaply and that the export capacity was 
purchased because it was expected that SMP might be lower than the GB 
wholesale price at night. The 120 MW export capacity was used (by 
purchasing the allocated quantities of energy for the relevant time periods) 
from midnight on. 
Finally, at the WD1 auction, a further 55 MW was imported between 11:30 
and 15:00, 70 MW between 18:30 and 21:00 and 50 MW was exported 
between midnight and 5am. 
The resulting combined metered generation is illustrated in the graph which 
shows net imports from 6:00 to 00:00 and net exports from midnight. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
                    
  EA - 8am 
       
  
  Participant PT_4000XX 
 
Time 
EA1 
MIUN 
EA2 
MIUN 
WD 
MIUN  
X_Ltd. MG 
(MW) 
  Import Capacity: 100 
 
06:00 100 0 
 
100   
  Export Capacity : 0 
 
06:30 100 0 
 
100   
  
   
07:00 100 0 
 
100   
  
   
07:30 100 0 
 
100   
  WD - 9am 
  
08:00 100 0 
 
100   
  Available Import 40 
 
08:30 100 0 
 
100   
  Available Export 200 
 
09:00 100 0 
 
100   
  
   
09:30 100 0 
 
100   
  EA2 -11am 
  
10:00 100 0 
 
100   
  Available Import 140 
 
10:30 100 0 
 
100   
  Available Export 200 
 
11:00 100 0 
 
100   
  
   
11:30 100 0 55 155   
  
   
12:00 100 0 55 155   
  
   
12:30 100 0 55 155   
  
   
13:00 100 0 55 155   
  
   
13:30 100 0 55 155   
  
   
14:00 100 0 55 155   
  
   
14:30 100 0 55 155   
  
   
15:00 100 0 55 155   
  
   
15:30 100 0 
 
100   
  
   
16:00 100 0 
 
100   
  
   
16:30 100 0 
 
100   
  
   
17:00 100 0 
 
100   
  
   
17:30 100 0 
 
100   
  
   
18:00 100 0 
 
100   
  
   
18:30 100 0 70 170   
  
   
19:00 100 0 70 170   
  
   
19:30 100 0 70 170   
  
   
20:00 100 0 70 170   
  
   
20:30 100 0 70 170   
  
   
21:00 100 0 70 170   
  
   
21:30 100 0 
 
100   
  
   
22:00 100 0 
 
100   
  
   
22:30 100 0 
 
100   
  
   
23:00 100 0 
 
100   
  
   
23:30 100 0 
 
100   
  
   
00:00 100 -120 -50 -70   
  
   
00:30 100 -120 -50 -70   
  
   
01:00 100 -120 -50 -70   
                 
Figure 3.10 Illustration of a theoretical company's trading for one day (06:00 to 
01:00 only shown due to space constraints) 
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3.4.2 The Rules 
EWIC is owned and managed by EirGrid Interconnector Ltd. (EIL) and Moyle 
by Moyle Interconnector Ltd. (MIL), part of Mutual Energy. The Interconnector 
Owners are required to prepare relevant access arrangements in respect of 
the interconnectors. The access arrangements are the agreed rules that need 
to be adhered to when auctioning and using capacity on the interconnectors. 
The published access arrangements detail the following information; 
1. The procedures for auctioning rights to use interconnector capacity 
2. The terms on which users may participant in auctions and 
3. The terms for use of interconnector capacity. 
In accordance with EU legislation the full transmission capacity of the 
interconnectors is made available to market participants so that energy can 
be imported or exported as market prices dictate, for the benefit of customers 
in AI and Great Britain (EirGrid, 2014). 
3.4.3 MO and IA Responsibilities 
The Available Transfer Capacity of an Interconnector is determined by the IA 
and is notified to the Market Operator by 10:00 two days before the trading 
day (TD-2). 
The IA must then submit the Active Interconnector Unit Capacity Holding Data 
for each Interconnector Unit prior to the EA1 Gate Window Closure that is 
consistent with the Interconnector Available Transfer Capacity (ATC) in each 
direction.     
Following the completion of each EA1, EA2 and WD1 MSP Software Run the 
Market Operator shall: 
 Determine Interconnector Unit Nominations for each Interconnector 
Unit and for each Interconnector based on the relevant inputs 
(including Commercial Offer Data, Interconnector Technical Data and, 
in the case of the EA1 MSP Software Run only, the Active 
Interconnector Unit Capacity Holding).   
 Calculate the Modified Interconnector Unit Nominations (MIUNs), 
separately for each Interconnector in accordance with the relevant 
rules.  
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 Submit Aggregate Modified Interconnector Unit Nomination (AMIUNs) 
to the relevant System Operator.  AMIUNs represent aggregate import 
and export MW values per Trading Period over each Interconnector 
registered (CER & NI Utility Regulator, 2014). 
 
3.4.4 System Operator Trading 
Once the market has closed the SOs may initiate changes to the 
interconnector schedules via SO counter trading for reasons of system 
security or to facilitate priority dispatch generation (as directed in SEM 
Committee Decision paper SEM-11-062). 
The ability to counter trade is carried out in accordance with commercial 
parameters approved by the Regulatory Authorities (RAs); any relevant 
system limitations; and the availability of a counter party to give effect to any 
potential trade (EirGrid, 2014).  
In the past counter-trading on Moyle has been successfully used to alleviate 
curtailment of priority dispatch generation. EirGrid is already engaged in 
System Operator to System Operator (SO-SO) trading on EWIC with National 
Grid UK to alleviate curtailment (EirGrid, 2014). 
In addition to this, EirGrid is pursuing options which will allow a greater level 
of SO counter trading. 
Discussions with National Grid UK and the RAs have taken place. Three 
potential enhanced SO counter trading models are being explored at present:  
1. EirGrid and SONI trading directly on a UK Power Exchange;  
2. An agent trading on EirGrid and SONI’s behalf;  
3. EirGrid and SONI trading bilaterally with market participants (EirGrid, 
2014).  
3.4.5 Interconnector Administrator Trading 
The interconnector administrator can also engage in trades on the 
interconnector for balancing purposes. This constitutes a very small portion of 
total flows across the interconnector as outlined in Figure 6.18 in Chapter 6. 
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4 I-SEM and the Internal Energy Market; 
Implications for Interconnection 
4.1 Regulatory Framework 
A group of directives and regulations known as the Third Energy Package 
together with associated Framework Guidelines and Network Codes form the 
cornerstone of the Internal Energy Market, which Ireland and Northern 
Ireland have committed to achieving by 2016 (EirGrid & SONI, 2014). 
Interconnection provides the physical infrastructure necessary for this Internal 
Energy Market to function. 
A parallel and complementary development, Regional Electricity Markets 
(REM), part of the Electricity Regional Initiative (ERI) has created several 
regional electricity markets as an interim step to creating the single market. 
Ireland belongs to the France-UK-Ireland (FUI) regional electricity market. 
4.2 An EU Target for Installed Interconnector Capacity 
The European Council have long held the view that low levels of 
interconnection have the effect of fragmenting the European Electricity 
market and are an obstacle to both the development of competition and 
uptake of renewable energy. In March 2002 The European Council agreed on 
a level of interconnection between Member States of 10% of installed 
production capacity by 2005. “Eight long years later even this meagre goal 
remains elusive” said former European Green Party spokesperson Butikofer in 
2010. 
Determined to accelerate progress, the European Commission adopted a list 
of 248 key energy infrastructure projects in October 2013. These projects 
have been selected by twelve regional groups established by the new 
guidelines for Trans-European Energy Network (TEN-E) (EirGrid Group, 2013). 
In March of this year the Council called for ‘speedy implementation of 
measures to meet the target of achieving interconnection of at least 10% of 
installed electricity production capacity for all member states’ (European 
Council, 2014) and invited the Commission to propose specific interconnection 
objectives to be attained until 2030. The integrated climate and policy 
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framework to 2030, due to be agreed upon in October 2014, is set to include 
defined targets for installed interconnection capacity. 
4.3 SEM Progress towards the Target Model 
While targets for installed interconnector capacity are currently non-binding, 
the European targets associated with market structure and trading are 
required by law. These changes are designed to harmonise cross border 
trading arrangements across all European electricity markets.  
The associated new rules will be binding on all EU borders by 2014 and the 
current SEM is not compliant with these rules.  
Because of the significant changes required to the SEM a two year derogation 
period has been granted to Ireland and Northern Ireland. The new Integrated 
Single Electricity Market (I-SEM) for the all island electricity market must 
therefore be compliant with the EU Target Model by the end of 2016 (SEM 
Committee, 2014). 
Aspects of the Internal Energy Market requirements, such as firm day-ahead 
price coupling and continuous inter-day trading, will have significant impacts 
on the Single Electricity Market (SEM) arrangements but should, in theory, 
make it easier to trade across the interconnectors.  
The target model does not explicitly prescribe how the national market is to 
comply with the legislation and so a range of possible new market designs 
were compiled by a SEM Committee comprising members of the regulatory 
authorities in Ireland and Northern Ireland plus two independent experts. The 
Northern Ireland Department of Trade and Industry and the Irish Department 
of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources provide policy guidance to 
this SEM Committee.  
At a minimum, changes to the high level market design of SEM must provide 
for the following five pillars by 2016 (as set out in the ACER Framework 
Guidelines for Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management and the ACER 
Framework Guidelines on Electricity Balancing):  
 Capacity Calculation and zones delimitation including a review of the 
bidding zones in the SEM and potential interactions with locational 
signals  
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 Cross Border Forward Hedging and Harmonisation of allocation rules  
 Day Ahead Market Coupling  
 Intra Day Continuous Trading  
 Cross Border Balancing  
 
In 2012, the SEM Committee first published four new market design options 
for the SEM which represent different ways of implementing the EU Target 
Model. 
The SEM Committee presented these options in their latest form in February 
of this year in a Consultation Paper entitled ‘Integrated Single Electricity 
Market; High Level Design for Ireland and Northern Ireland from 2016’. The 
paper refers to the new wholesale market as the Integrated Single Electricity 
Market (I-SEM); a title designed to ‘recognise the continuity of the existing 
market while acknowledging the purpose of the new market to integrate more 
fully with European market arrangements’ (SEM Committee, 2014).  
The four options presented are  
1. The Adapted Decentralised Market 
2. The Mandatory ex-post Pool for Net Volumes 
3. The Mandatory Centralised Market and  
4. The Gross Pool –Net Settlement Market 
 
These options combine different approaches to the following market aspects: 
 Participation in European markets for trading of energy in Day ahead 
and Intra-day timescales 
- Choices pertaining to this aspect of the market design will 
involve decisions around portfolio vs. unit bidding, Mandatory vs. 
voluntary and bid format at Day ahead and Intra-day timescales. 
 Process for reaching feasible dispatch position 
- Here decisions must be made regarding the starting point of 
dispatch, bids to the TSO for balancing and dispatch and the 
timing of bid submissions 
 Imbalance/ Pool settlement 
 Arrangements for long-term trading; both internal and cross-border 
 
How the four proposed options for I-SEM address each of the above market 
components is outlined in Appendix B. 
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At present, Option 3 appears to be the favoured solution. Option 3, ‘The 
Mandatory Centralised Market’ emphasises the importance of the Day Ahead 
Market as the main market for physical trading of energy between market 
participants. The Intra-Day Market is then the exclusive route for making 
adjustments. This should, according to the SEM Committee, ensure a high 
level of trading in these specific markets. Bidding is based on individual 
generators submissions, which is intended to enhance transparency in the 
markets. The arrangements for balancing electricity generation and demand 
involve relatively simple bids for increases and decreases in output (SEM 
Committee, 2014). 
 
4.4 Key Implications of market changes for Interconnection 
The move to I-SEM should impact trade across the interconnector –given that 
the ultimate goal of the European Target Model is to facilitate more efficient 
trade. Two of the key areas where changes have been proposed are described 
below. A detailed description of the proposed options is available from the 
SEM Committee’s I-SEM High Level Design for Ireland and Northern Ireland 
from 2014 Consultation Paper, available from the All Island Project website. 
4.4.1 Market Coupling 
Market coupling is a mechanism by which order books from different Power 
Exchanges and capacity information from corresponding TSOs are centralized 
and exploited to determine traded volumes, flows and prices (N-Side, 2012). 
In simpler terms, it is .an algorithm which takes bids and offers from two (or 
more) markets at day ahead stage, works out prices for both and schedules 
interconnector flows to minimise overall cost’ (McGuckin, 2014). 
4.4.1.1 Price Coupling of Regions 
The European Target Model requires optimisation of area and cross-border 
trades based on implicit auctions. This will be facilitated through Price 
Coupling of Regions (PCR) 
The North-Western Europe (NWE) Price Coupling of Regions initiative (PCR) is 
an initiative taken by the Transmission System Operators and Power 
Exchanges of the countries in North-Western Europe to develop a single price 
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coupling solution to be used to calculate electricity prices across Europe and 
allocate cross border capacity on a day-ahead basis (Nord Pool, 2014). 
EUPHEMIA is the PCR algorithm that solves optimally the market coupling 
problem by maximising consumer and supplier surplus and any congestion 
rent arising from congested cross border links (EirGrid, SONI, SEMO). 
The PCR solution went live on February 4th 2014 and the regions currently 
involved are illustrated in Figure 4.1. As is clear from figure 4.1, the ultimate 
goal is a pan-European Price Coupling of Day Ahead power market. EirGrid 
and SEMO are ‘associated members’ of the PCR which allows them access to 
the necessary information to keep abreast of developments in the PCR 
initiative. 
The algorithm is quite different from the SEM MSP Software in that it 
optimises the purchase and sale of energy products (orders) as opposed to 
optimising the schedule of generation. As such, part of the new I-SEM design 
will involve implementing bid types that are ‘Euphemia-compliant’. 
 
Figure 4.1 Map of Markets included in and associated with the Price Coupling of 
Regions Initiative 
One aspect of this will be to increase the number of gate windows. As outlined 
in Chapter three, at present there are only two gate windows for implicit 
capacity allocation (EA2 and WD1). Under I-SEM, this may go to 24 hourly 
windows or 48 if half hour trading is selected. 
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4.4.2 Types of Transmission Rights 
It has yet to be decided whether physical or financial transmission rights will 
be implemented under I-SEM. 
Physical Transmission Rights (PTRs) represent the current situation. They 
allow market participants to directly hedge the price and volume risk 
associated with forward cross-border energy trades. However, PTRs can 
reduce the amount of physical cross-zonal capacity available for implicit 
allocation in the day-ahead market which may reduce the effective liquidity of 
the day-ahead market (SEM Committee, 2014). 
A Financial Transmission Right (FTR) does not give the holder a right to 
physically nominate a flow at the day-ahead stage. Instead they receive the 
price differential between the two zones for which they hold cross-zonal 
capacity. FTRs can either be options (in which case the payment to the FTR 
holder is never less than zero) or they can be obligations (whereby the FTR 
holder has to make a payment if the price differential is in the opposite 
direction to their capacity holding) (SEM Committee, 2014). 
FTRs allow market participants to directly hedge the price risk associated with 
forward cross-border energy trades, without reducing the amount of physical 
capacity available to be used in market coupling. However, they rely on liquid 
day ahead markets being in place in order to allow the FTR holder to manage 
its volume risk (i.e. whether or not it will get scheduled) (SEM Committee, 
2014).  
The type of cross border transmission products (FTRs or PTRs) thus depends 
largely on the liquidity (and hence the compulsory nature) of the day ahead 
market (SEM Committee, 2014). 
However, as yet no decision has been taken in relation to the proposed future 
design of the I-SEM and severe criticism has been made of the favoured 
approach of the SEM Committee by industry and others in responses to its 
recent consultation on the proposed High Level Design. Industry responses to 
the consultation can be found at the following address; 
http://www.allislandproject.org/en/wholesale_overview.aspx?article=79e244a
0-4c06-4729-bd20-92873869df82  
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5 Methodology 
The methodology designed to meet the aims and objectives of this thesis 
(listed in section 1.3.1) is described in this chapter which is divided into two 
sections. 
Part one outlines the methodology employed for quantitative data analysis. 
Here data sets and their sources are listed; data collation is explained; 
analytical tools are described and finally the specific steps taken in the 
analysis itself are outlined. 
Part 2 describes the qualitative component of the study which included an 
extensive review of published literature; including EU, CER, Utility Regulator, 
SEM and Ofgem regulations and guidelines, official consultation documents 
and responses. Stakeholder interviews are also covered in this section. 
Both sections begin with a general overview of data sources and analysis 
techniques used. The approach then taken to answer specific research 
questions follows. A summary of the specific methodology used to meet each 
aim and objective is tabulated and presented in Appendix C. 
5.1 Part I. Data Analysis 
5.1.1 Obtaining the Data 
Data for this analysis was primarily acquired from four sources; the dynamic 
report section of the SEMO website, the apx group website and EirGrid and 
SONI’s Wind Generation data centres. 
5.1.1.1 Source 1, SEMO Dynamic and Static Reports 
Once registered with the SEMO website, dynamic and static reports covering 
multiple stages and elements of the market process can be downloaded. 
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Figure 5.1 Screen shot showing process of selecting data from SEMO's dynamic report 
database 
The following reports were utilised in this analysis. Where the option of 
selecting a run type was available, Run Type EP2 was selected unless 
otherwise specified. Run Type EP2 occurs four days after the trading date. 
5.1.1.1.1 Registered Units 
A list of Registered Generator Units as of 28/05/2014 was downloaded from 
the ‘Joining the Market’ section of the SEMO website. This list contains details 
of the Associated account (ID and Name combined), TS_ID, Unit ID, Unit 
Name, Unit Type, Registration Status and Final Effective Date.  
 
Figure 5.2 Location of registered units on SEMO website 
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Data from SEMO’s Registered Capacity Report was also utilised. This report 
lists generator units and includes details registered capacity of that unit, the 
resource type, fuel type and jurisdiction, and the account with which that 
generating unit is associated with. 
In the Registered List of Generator Units, Interconnector Unit IDs are 
presented in the following format; Participant ID_I_Resource Name_Gate 
Window. For example,   
PT_500032_I_NIMOYLE_EA 
Where PT_500032 represents the Interconnector Participant Viridian Energy 
Supply Ltd (determined from the Registered Capacity Report), ‘I’ indicates 
this is a registered Interconnector Unit, NIMOYLE indicates that this unit is 
used for trading across the Moyle Interconnector and EA indicates it is used 
for trading at the EA Gate Window (for an explanation of Gate Windows see 
Chapter 3) . 
 
5.1.1.1.2 Interconnector Flows 
Flows of electricity across the interconnector are available from the SEMO 
database in a number of formats. The following two datasets were primarily 
employed: 
Interconnector Flow 
Interconnector Flow data presents  Metered Generator data for the 
interconnector characterised by Unit ID (which, as outlined above includes 
information on the participant, on which interconnector the trade took place 
across and on the Gate Window associated with this trade), Meter Type, Run 
Type, Trade Date and Delivery Date, hour and interval. 
Interconnector Administrator and Transmission System Operator Flows are 
included here. Given that this dataset presents Metered Generation, Run Type 
is always EP2. 
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Modified Interconnector Unit Nominations 
MIUN data is presented in MW and categorised by participant name, resource 
name, run type, trade date, delivery date, delivery hour and delivery interval 
when downloaded from the SEMO website. 
The Market Schedule Quantity for each Interconnector Unit in the EA1 
software run is fixed into an Initial Interconnector Unit Nomination 
representing the quantity nominated for import or export for each IC unit. 
These IUNs are subsequently adjusted to take into account factors such as IC 
Dead bands between minimum import and minimum export to produce the 
Modified Interconnector Unit Nomination (MIUN) for each IC unit in each 
Trading Period (CER, 2013).  
Any further capacity on the Interconnector can then be allocated based upon 
the offers from IUs for the EA2 Gate (performed 13:00 D-1), such allocation is 
again fixed into MIUNs for those Units.  
The remaining capacity (if any) can be allocated to Interconnector Units which 
make Offers for the WD1 Gate (09:30 D trading window is second half of day 
(after 18:00) only) (CER, 2013). 
Thus if an interconnector has imported and/ or exported flows across the 
interconnector using multiple gate windows (as illustrated in figure X –
Chapter 3) these will be represented in the Market Schedule Quantity as 
separate MIUNs. 
MIUN data does not contain information on Interconnector Administrator or 
Transmission System Operator Flows. In summary, they represent the final 
quantity of electricity all commercial interconnector users pay or are paid for. 
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Figure 5.3 Screenshot of Modified Interconnector Unit Nomination Dynamic Report, 
SEMO website 
 
5.1.1.1.3 Shadow Price and SMP 
SMP represents the energy component of the total cost of producing 
electricity. As outlined in Chapter 3, the final SMP, paid to generators and by 
suppliers, is calculated by the EP2 software run. Data is classified by Trade 
Date, Run Type, Currency, Delivery Date, Delivery Time (in the form hh:mm, 
GMT), SMP and Shadow Price. Shadow price data was not utilised in this 
analysis.  
 
5.1.1.2 Source 2, GB Power Exchange Data 
Given the differences in market structure between the GB and AI systems 
(described in Chapter 3) there is no single figure comparable with AI SMP in 
the GB market. 
However, power exchanges, which constitute a small portion of trading in GB 
represent an indication of wholesale price according to the BSC Administrator, 
Elexon (Elexon, 2013). Reference price data from the apx Power exchange 
has been employed here. The methodology used to establish the Reference 
Price Data (RPD) indices for the APX Power UK Spot market is available on the 
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apx group website. The units used are GBP and the data is presented in a 
date-time interval matrix for each year. 
 
Figure 5.4 Screenshot of the location from which apx RPD data was obtained from the 
apx Power Exchange website 
Historical daily exchange rate data from the SEMO website was used to 
convert these values from GBP to Euro. A Vlookup was used in excel to match 
the correct exchange rates with the relevant data entries. 
 
5.1.1.3 Source 3, EirGrid and SONI Wind Data 
Wind Generation and Wind Forecast in MW can be downloaded from Eirgrid 
and SONI’s websites for the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland 
respectively across a specific period of time in fifteen minute intervals. 
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5.1.2 Collating Data Sources 
In order to analyse the data listed above, it had to first be collated –this was 
primarily done by time interval or Unit ID. 
While all SEMO and APX data employed was given in half hour intervals, these 
time intervals were presented in different formats for different data sets. 
For example, SEMO sometimes present time intervals in two columns, one for 
date in the form dd/mm/yyyy and one for time in the form hh:mm. 
Other times, SEMO presented time intervals in the form of delivery date, 
delivery hour, and delivery interval; with delivery hour being represented by 
Figure 5.5 Screenshot of the location from which wind forecast and 
generation data was obtained from the apx EirGrid website 
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an integer from 1 to 24 and delivery interval being either 1 or 2 to represent 
respectively the first and second half hour period. 
Where this format is used, sometimes delivery hour 1, delivery interval 1 
represents the period from 01:00 hours to 01:30 GMT.  
Other times, (1,1) represented the period from 07:00 – 07:30 GMT , the first 
half hour of the SEMO trading day which runs from 7am to 7am.  
There are also instances where delivery hour 1, interval 1 refers to the time 
period from 00:00 to 00:30. 
As the protocol being used for each set of SEMO data is not clarified, the 
datasets had to be graphed and a knowledge of daily patterns used to 
determine which protocol was being used. 
Collating data according to Time Interval 
In order to combine and compare different variables, a uniform means of 
expressing date and time in one column had to be determined.  
This was achieved by calculating date in dd/mm/yyyy format and time in 
hh/mm format, and combining them to produce a unique decimal number 
representing that date and time. 
This requires a knowledge of how excel represents dates and times. 
Excel represents all dates relative to 01/01/1990. So 01/01/1990 equals 1 
when converted to ‘general’ format. 01/01/2014 converts to 41,640 –the 
number of days since 01/01/1990. 
Time in hh/mm format will convert to number of minutes since 00:00 when 
converted to general format. So 08:30 will produce 510 when converted to 
general form. 
With this knowledge, date and time, regardless of how they were presented in 
any number of columns could be converted to a single cell entry in the form 
‘dd/mm/yyyy hh:mm’ allowing different data sets to be combined. 
Table 5.1 illustrates how this method is used to convert delivery date, hour 
and interval to a single ‘Time Code’. 
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 First, time interval is converted to minutes using an ‘if’ statement (if 
delivery hour is equal to 1 return 0, if it is equal to 2 return 30). The 
time in minutes is calculated by multiplying the delivery hour by 60 and 
adding column 4,  to produce column 5 
 To represent this in time format in excel, this figure must be divided by 
1440 (the number of minutes in one day) and the format converted to 
‘time’. See column 6. 
 Delivery date and time in hh:mm format are added in column 7. 
 Column 8 represents the values in column 7 in ‘general’ format.  
For the case of apx data where time was expressed as hh:mm – hh:mm, the 
data had to be first split into separate columns and the second time removed 
before time could be converted to minutes. 
When this figure had been calculated for each time period for each set of 
data, a Vlookup was used to combine the three sets accurately. 
Table 5.1 Example of how uniform 'Time Code' was calculated to combine data sets 
Column 1 
Column 
2 
Column 
3 
Column 
4 
Column 
5 
Column 
6 Column 7 Column 8 
Delivery 
Date 
Delivery 
Hour 
Delivery 
Interval 
Delivery 
Interval 
represe
nted in 
minutes 
Real 
time 
in 
minut
es 
Minutes / 
1400 to 
convert 
to excel 
time 
format 
Delivery 
Date plus 
'real time' 
combined 
Time Code –
Delivery date 
and time as a 
decimal 
31/05/2014 7 1 0 420 07:00:00 
31/05/2014 
07:00 
41790.291666
6667 
31/05/2014 7 2 30 450 07:30:00 
31/05/2014 
07:30 41790.3125 
31/05/2014 8 1 0 480 08:00:00 
31/05/2014 
08:00 
41790.333333
3333 
31/05/2014 8 2 30 510 08:30:00 
31/05/2014 
08:30 
41790.354166
6667 
 
Collating Data according to Participant ID, Unit ID or Account Name 
By separating data into columns and using a series of Vlookups, the 
Registered Generator Unit dataset and the data from SEMO’s Registered 
Capacity report were combined to create a comprehensive dataset on 
registered participants and their associated units.  
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This could then be used in combination with the vlookup function to enrich 
datasets that included minimal information on the interconnector user 
associated with the entry. 
5.1.3 Data Analysis 
Once datasets had been collated as described above, Excel ‘Pivot Tables’ were 
employed to add, compare and graph variables. Figure 5.6 illustrates a 
section of a pivot table. Figure 5.7 illustrates how data from that table is 
converted to a pivot chart. Each column from the pivot table is represented in 
the menu to the right of the pivot chart and variables can be added, removed 
and manipulated. 
 
Figure 5.6 Screenshot of a Pivot Table 
 
Figure 5.7 Screenshot of a Pivot Chart being created from the data in the Pivot Table 
in Figure 5.4 
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5.1.4 Compiling and comparing Interconnector Flows and influencing factors; 
Methodology 
This section of the analysis required the collation of a number of data sets. 
Given the volume of data involved and the time constraints, it was decided 
that just one month would be analysed. June 2014 was selected as, at the 
time, this was the most recently available data and would produce the most 
up to date results. 
Firstly, to represent the correlation between interconnector flows and other 
factors; Interconnector Flow, All Island System Load, Wind Generation, APX 
RPD and SMP data were graphed for one month. These data sets were 
correlated by time using the method described in section 5.1.2. 
The results could then be graphed using a pivot table, as described in section 
5.1.2 and compared. The pivot table allowed different variables to be added 
or removed to identify their relative weighting and facilitate closer inspection. 
Moyle and EWIC were found to display similar characteristics and so were 
graphed as a single line for clarity of visual inspection. 
Next, in order to understand better how the interconnector is being used, 
MIUN data for one full year (June 2013 – June 2014) was compiled and 
cumulative flows for each gate window in both the SEM to BETTA and BETTA 
to SEM direction were calculated. The results were presented in tabular, pie 
chart and bar chart form to illustrate clearly the overall distribution and trends 
emerging over time. 
The results were then presented for just one representative week so that daily 
trading patterns could be identified. 
Next, each MIUN value was matched with its associated Interconnector User. 
This was achieved by comparing Unit ID columns in the MIUN data set with 
those in the Registered Units dataset and employing a Vlookup. 
Using the filtering feature available in excel Pivot Tables, the Modified 
Interconnector Unit Nomination (MIUN) data for each Interconnector User 
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over the full year could be presented separately allowing trading patterns to 
be identified. 
5.1.5 Approximating the Welfare Benefits of the Interconnector; Methodology 
In order to illustrate the welfare benefits of the interconnector to Irish 
consumers, a simplified analysis comparing the estimated cost of net energy 
imports for June 2014 with the theoretical amount it would have cost us to 
produce this energy at home were the interconnectors not available. 
First net commercial imports had to be derived from MIUN Data which is 
available from SEMO’s dynamic report database. MIUN was used because it 
excludes IA and TSO trades which allows us to examine just commercial 
trades and ignore balancing and counter trading. 
MIUN MW data is categorised by participant name, resource name, run type, 
trade date, delivery date, and delivery hour and delivery interval when 
downloaded from the SEMO website. As such, the data had to be sorted and 
all participant trades totalled for each time period. Different numbers of IUs 
participated in the various trading intervals so two sorting columns were 
created to gather and total entries associated with each time period using ‘if’ 
statements in excel. 
SMP data was also downloaded from the SEMO Dynamic Reports database. 
As previously discussed, Power Exchange data from the UK can be used an 
approximate for GB wholesale price. ‘APX Power UK RPD historical data’ was 
downloaded from the APX Group website for the month of June.  
The three data sets were collated by ‘Time Code’ as described in section 5.2. 
As SMP and APX RPD data are given in €/MW and £/ MW, MIUN values were 
not converted to MWh. This is allowable because the same time periods are 
used across all data sets, but it means we must examine proportional 
differences rather than actual values.  
Net imports could then be multiplied by the approximated value for GB 
wholesale electricity price for each time period. The cumulative total of these 
values is an estimate of the cost of net imports for that month. 
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Net imports were then multiplied by SMP values to represent what the cost of 
producing this electricity at home would have been. It should be noted that 
this represents an estimation, not an actual figure, as we would expect SMP 
for these periods to have been higher were the interconnector not in place. 
Additionally, the SMP does not include capacity or constraint payments. 
5.1.6 Are the Interconnectors helping us to achieve our Renewable Targets; 
Methodology 
This section of the data analysis was again limited to one month; June 2014. 
Unlike previous sections that exclusively looked at commercial flows, this 
section of the report included Transmission System Operator and 
Interconnector Administrator Flows in an attempt to quantify the impact of 
EirGrid Counter Trading on the facilitation of wind. 
Firstly cumulative flows for the month were compared to determine the 
overall volume and net direction of TSO trades. Next, TSO counter flows were 
graphed against actual and forecast wind data obtained from EirGrid and 
SONI as described above. 
 
5.2 Part II: Qualitative Analysis; Literary Review and Interviews 
 
5.3 Literature Review 
In addition to the published reports and analyses reviewed as part of Chapter 
2, a wide range of EU, Ofgem, SEM, CER and Utility Regulator and Eirgrid 
published regulations, consultation documents and associated responses, final 
decision papers and conference proceedings were reviewed and critically 
analysed. 
5.4 Semi Structured Interviews 
Semi Structured interviews, as defined by Robson (Robson, 2002) refer to 
interviews which have predetermined questions, but the order can be 
modified based upon the interviewer’s perception of what seems most 
appropriate. Question wording can be changed and explanations given; 
particular questions which seem inappropriate with a particular interviewee 
can be omitted, or additional ones included. 
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Once an initial appreciation of the processes involved in interconnection and 
the key issues had been determined, semi-structured interviews were 
completed with energy traders based in Ireland who participate in purchasing 
and selling capacity and energy across the interconnector. In addition to 
enquiries regarding specific points that required clarification on account of 
contradictions within the literature, these interviews involved a number of 
open ended questions which allowed the interviewees to highlight the most 
important material that the interviewer may otherwise not have been aware 
of. 
The interviewees and the companies for whom they work have been kept 
confidential for the sake of commercial sensitivity. 
5.5 Critical Analysis of EirGrid Study; Methodology 
A critical analysis of EirGrid’s 2014 study (Campbell, 2014) is undertaken in 
Chapter 6. This was informed by the following sources; 
 EWIC Impact to SEM; Explanation of Analysis (Campbell, 2014) 
 Information Note on the East West Interconnector (EirGrid, 2014) 
 CER Decision CER/13/191 ‘Accessing Tariffs and Financing the Gas 
Transmission System; Consultation Process (CER, 2013) and Decision 
Paper (CER, 2013)  and published industry responses to the new 
regulation. 
 Solver Choice in the SEM: A Comparative Study of Lagrangian 
Relaxation vs. Mixed Integer Programming (Eirgrid, SONI, 2010) 
 Interviews with market participants. 
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6 Results and Discussion 
6.1 Introduction 
Delivery of the objectives listed in chapter 1, part 3 is reported in this chapter 
which is divided as follows. 
In section 6.2, the prevailing trends in direction and volume of interconnector 
flows are presented. This sets the basis for section 6.3, which attempts to 
ascertain how the interconnector is being used and what the motivating 
factors for trading across the interconnector are. This study would assert that 
an understanding of these factors is a vital prerequisite to determining the 
best regulatory measures to optimise welfare. 
In section 6.4 and 6.5, the performance of the interconnectors with respect to 
reducing the price of electricity and facilitating renewable generation is 
assessed. 
A final conclusion on the results is presented in Chapter 7. 
6.2 Interconnector Flows; Trends in Volumes and Direction 
Based on the theory of Interconnection outlined in Chapter 1, and the body of 
research presented in the literature review, one might expect to see a close 
correlation between SEM-BETTA wholesale price differences and 
Interconnector Flows. 
The data sample presented in figure 6.1 would indicate otherwise. Figure 6.1 
compares the combined net interconnector flows of Moyle and EWIC with 
price differences between the SEM and BETTA (where AI prices are 
represented by SMP and GB prices represented by APX RPD data) for one 
week in June 2014, AI total system load and wind generation for one week 
are also graphed. Price Differences have been scaled by 10 to allow more 
accurate visual inspection –as we are examining proportional differences not 
actual values this is acceptable.   
This comparison indicates that for Interconnection between AI and GB the 
correlations between price difference, wind and interconnector flows that one 
would expect based on the theory are not reflected in the real data. Indeed, 
66 
 
interconnector flows are almost exclusively from GB to AI in this sample 
despite clear instances of lower wholesale prices in AI.   
Interconnector flows are at their highest during the day when demand in 
Ireland is greatest and while net flows drop to zero or below (ie. net exporting 
is occurring) nightly in response to the predictable nightly drop in SMP, they 
do not appear to respond in any substantial way to arbitrage opportunities or 
instances of high volumes of wind on the SEM as they occur throughout the 
day. 
The following sections will examine why this is happening. 
 
Figure 6.1 All Island System Load, Wind Gen, IC Flows and Price Difference with UK 
apx rpd. for June 1-7th 2014 
As outlined in chapter 3 part 4, EA modified interconnector unit nominations 
represent energy flows associated with capacity which has been bought at 
long term ‘explicit’ auctions, be they annual auctions, seasonal, quarterly, 
monthly or daily. EA2 and WD1 MIUNs on the other hand represent energy 
Net Interconnector Flows Vs All Island System Load, Wind Generation and AI-GB Price 
Differences, 1st to 7th June 2014 
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and capacity purchased at implicit auctions. The EA2 bidding window closes at 
11:30 on the day prior to delivery and the auction covers the full SEM trading 
day (06:00 – 06:00). The bidding window for the WD1 auction closes at 07:00 
on the day of delivery and the auction covers a twelve hour period within the 
SEM trade day (18:00 – 06:00). 
Where these auctions fit into the SEMO timescale is summarised below. 
 
Figure 6.2 Cycle per trading day graphic, Source (SEMO, 2013) 
With this knowledge, we can interpret MIUN data available from the SEMO 
database to gain a basic understanding of the type of trades the 
interconnectors are predominantly being used for. Table 6.1 and Figure 6.3 
present a breakdown of interconnector flows by flow direction and auction 
type for the year long period from the 1st June 2013 to the 2nd of June 2014. 
Figure 6.4 illustrates the breakdown by month. 
Table 6.1 Figure 3 Breakdown of total AI GB Interconnector Flows by Direction and 
Auction Type, June 2013 – End May 2014. Note these figures do not include TSO or IA 
trades 
Row Labels Sum of EA + Sum of EA - Sum of WD1 + Sum of WD1 - Sum of EA2 + Sum of EA2 - 
I_NIMOYLE 3061910.605 -171782.106 96251.822 -15472.639 64353.951 -271279.178 
I_ROIEWIC 6637735.849 -379123.656 89963.371 -51290.243 52200.109 -357674.647 
Grand Total 9699646.454 -550905.762 186215.193 -66762.882 116554.06 -628953.825 
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Figure 6.3 Graphical representation of breakdown of total AI GB Interconnector Flows by 
Direction and Auction Type, June 2013 – June 2014. Note these figures do not include 
TSO or IA flows 
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Figure 6.4 Flows from GB to AI (positive) and AI to GB (negative) for EA, EA2 and 
WD1 Gate Windows June 2013 - End May 2014 
From this data we can ascertain that the bulk (89%) of flows across the 
Interconnectors from June 2013 to the end of May 2014 were from GB to AI 
and a staggering 97% of these imported flows were secured in advance via 
explicit auction. It is not surprising then that Figure 6.1 shows little response 
to short term price differentials – since the vast majority of energy flowing 
across the interconnector was secured in advance, traders could not possibly 
predict hour to hour to hour price differentials. 
Exports include a higher percentage of implicit auctions; trades associated 
with the EA2 gate window represent 51% and WD1 trades represent 5% of 
exports during this period. 
By examining flows again over a sample week long period, and this time 
breaking them down into their constituent EA, EA2 and WD1 MIUNs, a clear 
pattern can be identified.  
Flows from GB to AI (positive) and AI to GB (negative) for EA, EA2 and 
WD1 Gate Windows June 2013 - End May 2014 
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Figure 6.5 Trading across EWIC, breakdown by Gate Window for 11th to 17th May 
2014 
The EA flows from GB to AI demonstrate a distinct ‘blocky’ pattern which 
reinforces the idea that the capacity and energy associated with these flows 
has been purchased ‘in bulk’. As outlined in Chapter three, capacity is 
purchased for a period of time and the associated energy is then bought for 
intervals during that time (ie. there are times when the capacity which has 
been purchased will not be used because it is uneconomic to do so) –here, EA 
import capacity appears to be used during the day from approximately 09:00 
to 23:00 but is used to a much lesser extent at night. In discussion with a 
representative from a company which trades across the interconnector, it was 
explained that this is because, on average, SMP falls closer to, and sometimes 
below, the price of electricity in GB during these hours. Therefore it does not 
make economic sense to import energy during these hours. Exports too 
appear to be dominated by EA MIUNs for the week examined above; however 
from figure 6.3 we can see that over the course of the year, EA2 MIUNs 
accounted for 51% and EA for 44% of commercial trades. 
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In the next section of this report, we will break down these results further, 
this time by Interconnector Participant. This will allow us to identify the 
different trading strategies that make up net interconnector flows. 
6.3 Trading Across the Interconnector; Three Strategies 
Who is using the Interconnectors, how are they using them and why? 
Details of all registered Interconnector Users who secured commercial 
capacity on the Moyle and/ or East West Interconnectors from June 2013 to 
End May2014 have been compiled from a SEMO list of registered generator 
units and matched against MIUN data. These details are tabulated below with 
their associated parent companies. Note Cenergise and Endesa are registered 
on both Moyle and EWIC but only traded across EWIC for the duration of this 
analysis.  
Table 6.2 Details of active registered commercial Interconnector Users 
Parent 
Company 
Trading across MOYLE Trading across the EWIC 
 User ID User Name User ID User Name 
SSE Airtricity PT_500
021  
Airtricity Energy 
Supply NI Ltd 
Generation 
PT_400021 Airtricity Ltd 
(Generation) 
 
 
ESB Group PT_500
024  
Coolkeeragh ESB 
Ltd (Generation) 
PT_400030 ESB PGEN 
Viridian Group PT_500
031  
Viridan Energy 
Supply Ltd 
PT_400100 Viridian Energy 
Supply Limited 
Bord Gáis 
Éireann 
PT_500
037  
Bord Gais 
Interconnector 
(NI) 
PT_400099 Bord Gais 
Danske 
Commodities 
PT_500
070  
Danske 
Commodities A/S 
PT_500070 Danske 
Commodities A/S 
ElectroRoute PT_500
069  
ElectroRoute 
Energy Trading 
PT_400096 ElectroRoute 
Energy Trading 
RWE Group PT_500
058 
RWE Supply and 
Trading GmbH 
PT_400113 RWE Supply & 
Trading GmbH 
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Endesa Ireland 
Ltd. 
PT_500
071 
Endesa 
Generación 
PT_400114 Endesa 
Generación 
Cenergise Ltd. PT_500
075 
Cenergise Limited PT_400136 Cenergise Limited 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6 Breakdown of Total volumes commercially traded across Moyle & EWIC 
combined by Interconnector User (June 2013 - End May 2014) 
 
The following analysis shows that the companies listed here differ in their use 
of the interconnector, not just in terms of volumes traded but in total trading 
strategy. Using SEMO data, three distinct trading patterns have been 
identified and will be explored in the following sections. 
 
6.3.1  Hedging via the Interconnectors; ‘Bulk Buying’ Energy 
The trading behaviour of Bord Gáis is typical of how most large companies in 
Ireland have historically used the AI-GB interconnectors. 
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Total energy traded across the interconnector by Bord Gáis for the period 
from June 2013 to June 2014 is presented in Figure 6.7. The data illustrates 
that Bord Gáis have almost exclusively purchased capacity at explicit auction. 
In discussion with a representative from a large energy company, this 
strategy was explained as follows; Supply Company X wishes to hedge their 
portfolio and so they enter into a Contract for Difference with a registered 
interconnector User. In AI, the suppliers and registered interconnector users 
entering into this kind of arrangement are most commonly from the same 
company or group –the company or group will generally also have a 
generation portfolio. 
The Interconnector User then submits bids via the Auction Management 
Platform to secure long term import capacity to meet their contractual 
obligation. If they are successful in the capacity auction, they then purchase 
the associated energy either via a direct bilateral contract with a GB generator 
or trader or, more commonly, via a GB Energy Exchange. Using their 
knowledge of average AI-GB price differences though they will only purchase 
energy during the day when it is on average more profitable and they will 
forego their capacity at night.  
In this way, the supply company secures a guaranteed volume of energy to 
meet future demand at a fixed price that they expect will be on average lower 
than SMP for that period of time. It is important to note that they are 
interested in the average savings as opposed to taking advantage of price 
differences as they arise. The Interconnector User must also receive their 
share for conducting the trade. 
This behaviour is considerably different to the ‘optimal’ trading that was used 
to create the models to predict interconnector impact and justify its 
construction as described in the literature review. 
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Figure 6.7 Bord Gáis trade across the Moyle and East West Interconnectors from June 
2013 to End of May 2014 
Broadly speaking, RWE Supply and Trading GmbH traded in a similar manner 
for the period studied –with the exception of the high volumes exported 
nightly from the 2nd to the 8th of October. 
 
Figure 6.8 RWE trade across the Moyle and East West Interconnectors from June 
2013 to End of May 2014 
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6.3.2 Proprietary Traders –Capturing arbitrage opportunities 
At other end of the spectrum we have the companies whose strategies are 
characterised by arbitrage or proprietary trading, i.e. their trading strategies 
are designed to take advantage of price discrepancies through the purchase 
and sale of capacity and energy. These companies trade to profit from the 
market. 
Electroroute and Cenergise are two new companies based in Ireland who 
appear to be utilising the interconnector in this manner. According to the data 
collected here, these are currently the only two companies trading in this way. 
As illustrated in figure 6.9 and 6.10, the trading behaviour of these companies 
is markedly different to those described in section 6.3.1. 
Electroroute was established in 2011 and as illustrated in Figure 6.6 
accounted for 16% of total commercial energy traded across the 
interconnector during the year long period studied. Cenergise commenced 
operation less than a year ago and represented just 0.09% of energy traded 
during the period studied. Cenergise exclusively traded across EWIC for the 
period studied but are registered to trade on Moyle. 
The financial success of these companies in their use of the interconnectors in 
this manner is unknown due to the commercially sensitive nature of this 
information. The rate of expansion of Electroroute as a company however 
would tend to suggest the strategy is proving profitable. 
The redistribution of ‘welfare gains’ (as described in section 1.1) from this 
type of trading is also unknown. This thesis would propose that further study 
comparing the distribution of welfare gains from this type of trading; with the 
distribution of welfare gains modelled by early studies (particularly those 
justifying EU support of interconnection infrastructure) would be merited. 
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Figure 6.9 Cenergise trade across the Moyle and East West Interconnectors from June 
2013 to End of May 2014 
 
 
Figure 6.10 Electroroute trade across the Moyle and East West Interconnectors from 
June 2013 to End of May 2014 
 
6.3.3 Optimising Trades; A growing trend 
One of the most interesting trends to emerge from the data relates to a 
development in the trading behaviour of companies who traditionally would 
have taken a similar approach to Bord Gáis. This trend involves a growing 
pattern of exporting at night to capture price differentials 
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ESB and Airtricity, who together made up a third of energy traded across the 
Interconnectors during the period studied, have been the pioneers of this 
approach. As with Bord Gáis and RWE, ESB and Airtricity’s trading entities 
enter contracts for difference with their associated supply companies and 
purchase the energy to meet those contracts from GB, importing across the 
interconnectors. 
However, it appears that since November 2013, these two companies have 
begun to explore opportunities for arbitrage trading at night when SMP drops; 
at present, this is primarily taking the form of EA exports (purchasing from 
the SEM pool to sell in GB) in addition to some WD1 and EA2 trades in both 
directions. 
 
Figure 6.11 ESB Interconnector trade across the Moyle and East West 
Interconnectors from June 2013 to End of May 2014 
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Figure 6.12 Airtricity trade across the Moyle and East West Interconnectors from 
June 2013 to End of May 2014 
Viridian Energy Supply Ltd. who traded a full 22% of the energy traded across 
the interconnector during the period studied have also begun to engage with 
EA exports at night, however on a much smaller scale than ESB and Airtricity. 
 
Figure 6.13 Viridian Energy trade across the Moyle and East West Interconnectors 
from June 2013 to End of May 2014 
 
The significance of this change in behaviour of two key market participants is 
illustrated in the following graph of EA AI to GB trades. 
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Figure 6.14 EA MIUNs from AI to GB June 2013. 
 
6.3.4 Trading Trends Conclusion 
The trends identified in the above sections demonstrates clearly that despite 
the introduction of an intra-day trading window in 2011 (WD1), Energy 
associated with explicit capacity constitutes the vast bulk of flows across the 
Interconnector. This presents a new perspective on the concept of welfare 
gains given that it is evidently not possible to optimally respond to short term 
price differences using this approach, however, average price differences over 
a long term period can be captured.  
Given the relatively new phenomenon of arbitrage trading by Cenergise and 
Electroroute, it is difficult to determine what the impact of this will be. 
Whether or not these companies will help reduce the final price of electricity 
for consumers (which will depend on the volumes traded and degree of rent 
capture) they do seem to be impacting the trading behaviour of well 
established companies who are now exploring a more dynamic approach to 
trade across the interconnectors. Ultimately the degree of profitability will 
determine the extent to which this trading approach will grow. The resistance 
of Bord Gáis to adopt to this approach to date raises some questions, however 
their response to the latest I-SEM Consultation paper which argues 'Only large 
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portfolio players such as ESB Group are in a position to arbitrage portfolio 
bids to the detriment of the competitiveness of smaller players.‘ would 
suggest it is a matter of resources. 
6.4 Is trade across the Interconnectors reducing the Price of 
Electricity in Ireland? 
This section contains two parts, in the first; a simplistic analysis of the impact 
of Interconnection is undertaken using real data for the month of June 2014. 
In the second part, a critical analysis of EirGrid’s more detailed analysis is 
undertaken. 
6.4.1 SMP Vs APX RPD; What does the Data Say? 
In this section, an analysis is undertaken to compare an estimated value for 
the cost of net energy imported during the month of June with a theoretical 
value of what it would have cost to produce this energy in each market. 
A comparison of SMP and RPD for the month of June is illustrated in Figure 
6.15 and 6.16. The data is graphed once for the full month, and once from 
the first to the 28th to remove the extreme peak and allow closer inspection. 
The blue entry represents price difference (SMP – APX RPD). Positive values 
indicate the SMP is higher than the APX price, values below the zero axis 
indicate price in the GB is higher. 
 
Figure 6.15 SMP Vs apx RPD, June 2014 
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Figure 6.16 SMP Vs apx RPD, June 1st to 28th 2014 
Contrary to what was expected, the average reference price for GB at 58.97 
€/MW was higher by 15% than SMP (at 51.21 €/MW) for this period. 
Despite this, flows were predominantly in the GB -> AI direction.  
 
Figure 6.17 MIUNs June 2014 (MIUNs do not include TSO or IA flows). Positive values 
indicate flows from GB to Ireland. 
The following graph compares an estimated value for the cost of net energy 
imported during this period with a theoretical value of what it would have cost 
to produce the energy in country. The data is presented from the 1-28th as 
the extreme peak on the 29th changes the scale and makes visual inspection 
of the results more difficult. 
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 The results indicated the theoretical cost of purchasing net imports from GB 
in June 2014 was, over the course of the month, 18% higher than the 
estimated cost of producing in Ireland. 
These results are contrary to what would be expected based on the theory 
and literature review. What does this mean? 
Firstly, there are a number of assumptions which influence the margin of error 
that should be considered; 
1. As previously discussed, APX RPD is only an approximation for GB 
wholesale price. The actual prices secured by interconnector users 
importing energy to Ireland are confidential. 
2. Secondly, SMP does not include capacity or constraint payments. 
3. SMP would of course be different if indigenous generators were bidding 
into the SEM as opposed to the energy being imported across the 
interconnector. The studies outlined in the Literature Review indicate it 
would be higher without the interconnector. 
Figure 6.18 Estimated cost of purchasing net MW imported in June 1st - 28th 2014 from 
GB Vs Theoretical cost of producing this volume in country Where exports exceeded 
imports values were put to zero therefore earnings from exports not represented 
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Despite these assumptions, these results are still interesting as they suggest 
potential uneconomic use of the indicator which raises the possibility that 
systemic barriers to efficient trade exist. 
One factor to consider here is the extent to which capacity payments may 
have changed these results. As discussed in Chapter 3, Interconnector users 
importing into the SEM receive SMP and Capacity Payments based on flows. 
Interconnector Users exporting out from SEM pay SMP and Capacity Payments 
based on flows. If capacity payments were responsible for traders importing 
to the SEM when the price in GB was lower, this would constitute an 
inefficient use of the interconnector. The above results suggest that further 
investigation into whether these payments are potentially encouraging import 
flows where they are not economical would be merited. 
A second factor to consider is the changing dynamics in prices between the 
SEM and BETTA as discussed in the Literature review. The latest Regulatory 
Regular SEM Price Report (SEM-13-070) covering the period May - August 
2013 Inclusive indicated that UK prices remained lower, but noted that other 
markets listed did not include all energy and capacity costs in the same 
manner as the SEM and as a result, the comparison may not be completely 
accurate. 
 
Figure 6.19 Wholesale price per MW paid to generators across Europe, Source (CER & 
Utilit Regulator, 2013) 
The results presented in this section would suggest that close attention should 
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Ireland in the next report, and into the future, particularly as reforms are 
introduced to BETTA as part of the programme of Electricity Market Reform. 
This thesis would hold that the low levels of flows from AI to GB, despite clear 
arbitrage opportunities merits close attention. 
In a 2009 response to a SEM Consultation Paper (Moyle Interconnector Ltd, 
2009), Moyle Interconnector Limited found that one of the major problems 
non SEM traders identified with the SEM (and barriers to them entering SEM) 
was the lack of an ex ante price in the market. It was noted that they would 
expect this to be provided through a healthy liquid market for CFD’s but this 
did not exist. 
In discussion with Irish market traders as part of the research process for this 
thesis, the SEM SMP was described as being ‘notoriously difficult to predict’. 
Given this level of uncertainty, users are not prepared to take the increased 
risk of trading higher volumes. This was presented as a fundamental reason 
why more arbitrage opportunities are not being captured.  
6.4.2 Critical Analysis of EirGrid Published Results 
As outlined in the literature review, in April 2014 EirGrid published the results 
of an analysis of EWIC’s impact on overall production costs and SMP. The 
study found that for the duration of their analysis (1st May 2013 – 30th April 
2014) EWIC had had the effect of reducing the SMP by 9%. While conducting 
a sufficiently detailed independent analysis with the same goal was beyond 
the scope of this thesis, the methodology and assumptions of the EirGrid 
study will be analysed here with a view to determining the possible margin of 
error for their results. 
The analysis was based on the comparison of a base case ‘EWIC ON’ scenario 
representing EWIC being fully available from May 1st 2013 to April 1st 2014 
with an ‘EWIC OFF’ scenario representing an unconnected AI market for the 
same period. In order to model the Interconnector Off scenario, EirGrid 
replaced the interconnector with an equivalent sized gas generator and 
assumed the same bidding behaviour. 
This study found that three of the assumptions upon which this analysis was 
based do not reflect the current reality. Correcting these assumptions would 
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have cumulatively had the effect of lowering resulting percentage impact of 
the EWIC interconnector on SMP. 
1. Assumptions surrounding Bidding Behaviour 
EirGrid’s study assumed that market participants would adopt the same 
bidding behaviour with and without the interconnector.  
This assumption did not factor in the effect of a regulatory change to gas 
transmission tariffs which came into effect in October 2013, as per the CER 
Decision CER/13/191 of 21 August 2013. 
These changes provided for the removal of secondary gas capacity transfers 
at the exit and effectively meant that generators lost the flexibility to adjust 
their capacity to match their usage on a daily basis.  
This change was seen as a necessary response to under recovery of revenues 
by Bord Gáis which was a result of the reduction in domestic demand for 
baseload gas brought about by the introduction of the interconnector. The 
change in booking gas capacity was intended to deliver more certainty in 
relation to cost recovery for the gas transmission line owner. According to one 
industry response (Fullam, 2013) to CER/13/112, the CER’s consultation 
document on this issue, the cumulative effect of changes in gas transmission 
tariffs for 2013 was a 35.8% increase in transmission tariffs over 2012 levels 
and had ‘adversely impacted the cost competitiveness of Irish business’. 
Had EirGrid factored into their analysis that if the EWIC were not in place, 
Bord Gais would have continued to recover revenues sufficiently and the old 
regulations would have held, the EWIC OFF scenario would have returned 
lower SMPs than were predicted. 
The impact of this change in assumptions on the final results could be 
estimated by looking at the difference between baseload, mid merit and 
peaking gas plant pre October 2013 and then again post 2014. Unfortunately 
this was beyond the scope of this project due to time constraints. 
2. Solver Choice 
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This software used to solve SEM problems in the SEM is largely seen as ‘black 
box’ technology where commercial and technical data of participating 
generators is input and market schedules and prices are output.  
The Lagrangian Relaxation (LR) method is most commonly applied to solve 
unit commitment problems in the SEM. However SEMO have also developed a 
secondary solver for determining the Market Schedules and SMPs known as 
Mixed Integer Programming (MIP). MIP was originally designed as a back-up 
for LR and produces slightly different results –with the trend being that MIR 
returns slightly lower SMPs 
For simplicity, LR was applied uniformly when building the EWIC OFF model. 
This however does not reflect the reality where MIP solving is being used 
more and more frequently due to the increasingly complex nature of the 
market. 
Had MIP been factored in for a number of the days we can assume that the 
EWIC OFF scenario would have yielded slightly lower results for SMP and the 
measured impact of the Interconnector would have been slightly lower. 
3. Time Weighted Vs Volume Weighted. 
Energy prices are normally quoted as time weighted figures in the market. 
This study calculated volume weighted SMP which can vary slightly from time 
weighted SMP (sometimes higher, sometimes lower). This factor may have 
had a minor impact on the accuracy of results and is not the standard quote 
of energy price in the market. 
In summary, EirGrid’s conclusion that the EWIC has reduced the wholesale 
price of electricity in Ireland appears to be correct however, when the 
assumptions are considered more closely, particularly with respect to the 
bidding pattern of generators, it becomes clear that the extent to which it is 
doing so (9%) may be over-estimated. 
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6.5 Are the Interconnectors helping us to achieve our Renewables 
Targets?  
As discussed in the literature review, the majority of reports pre EWIC and 
many reports post EWIC, indicated that a key benefit of increased 
interconnection would be increased utilisation of wind. Whereby increased 
interconnection would allow Ireland to export wind during high wind periods 
and import power from Britain when wind levels were low; ‘In order to ensure 
wind is not unduly curtailed off the system, interconnection is of vital 
importance’ (Gorecki, 2011). 
As illustrated in section 6.2, actual commercial interconnector flows have not 
been responsive to wind. 
Additionally, European Legislation requires that Interconnection ‘should be 
facilitated as far as possible’ as not to do so could otherwise constitute an 
obstacle to trade. This means that Interconnector schedules are not re-
optimised by the TSOs i.e. consideration is not given to security of supply or 
transmission constraint requirements with respect to the interconnector 
(EirGrid, 2014).  In certain circumstances this may lead to constraint of wind 
generators in favour of imported electricity. The wind industry has registered 
their discontent with this, claiming that ‘An interconnector should be treated 
as a conventional generator, i.e. the priority dispatch of renewables should 
result in the “bumping” off of an importing interconnector (Irish Wind Energy 
Association, 2009).’ 
To counteract this effect, the Transmission System Operator has intervened 
by engaging in ‘Counter Trading’ across Moyle and EWIC as described in 
Section 3.4.4. 
Cumulative TSO Flows as a percentage of Total Interconnector Flows are 
illustrated in Figure 6.18. 
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As shown, Interconnector Flows corresponded to 14% of exports from the 
SEM and just 0.08% of imported flows. By graphing wind data against TSO 
Counter trades (Figure 6.21) we can see where the Transmission System 
Operator utilised this option. 
 
Figure 6.21 TSO Counter Flows Vs Wind Forecast and Actual Wind Generation, June 
2014. Note, a filter has been applied to illustrate just TSO Metered Generation, thus 
‘Sum of Metered Generation’ refers to these flows only. 
Figure 6.20 Breakdown of Total Interconnector Flows for June 2014 
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When we factor in price differentials between GB and AI, as illustrated in 
Figure 6.22, we see that TSO exports often occurred when the prices in the 
SEM were lower. The fact that these opportunities were not captured by 
commercial Interconnector Users and intervention was required by the TSO to 
prevent curtailment suggests again that trading is not optimal. 
 
Figure 6.22 TSO Trading Vs Wind and Price Difference (SMP and apx in €) 
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7 Conclusion 
In this final chapter, the research findings described in Chapter 6 are 
summarised, limitations are listed and recommendations for further research 
are presented. 
7.1 Research Findings 
Taking account of the results and discussion presented in Chapter 6, and the 
qualifications applying to the assumptions made, the conclusions of this 
study, which contribute to the aims and objectives listed in Chapter 1 are 
that; 
1. Assumption around economic trading across electricity interconnectors 
do not reflect the behaviour in the real market to date. 
2. There are a number of reasons for this, related to other risks to which 
the market participants are exposed; in particular, with regard to 
uncertainty around the firmness of price in real time in the SEM.  
3. The East West Interconnector has reduced System Marginal Price in the 
SEM but this study indicates it may not have done so to the extent 
reported by EirGrid in their 2014 analysis. 
4. The TSO has resorted to proxy trading to facilitate renewable 
generation in the absence of the commercial incentives to do so. This 
could be interpreted as a symptom of uneconomic use of the 
interconnector and an indication of potential barriers to efficient trade. 
5. The redesign of SEM to comply with the European Target Model risks 
further distortion to trading if the lessons from experience to date are 
not adequately addressed in this process. 
 
7.2 Limitations 
As discussed in section 1.4, and throughout Chapter 6, this thesis was 
constrained by a number of limitations with respect to time, software, data 
availability and number of interviews undertaken. 
With regard to software, use of the market modelling package PLEXOS would 
have enabled more detailed analysis. 
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In relation to data, assumptions had to be made to derive wholesale price; in 
the case of the SEM, the final wholesale prices including constraints and 
capacity payments were not available. GB prices had to be determined by 
reference to a price exchange. 
As outlined in section 1.4, the sample of interviews taken was not fully 
representative of all parties associated with the interconnector. As a result 
they had the potential to be biased although enquires were constructed to 
minimise this possibility. 
7.3 Recommendations for Future Research 
Chapter 6 clearly indicates that there is scope for future research to obtain a 
more in-depth understanding of trading behaviours across the Interconnector 
and barriers to its efficient utilisation with a view to identifying the best 
solutions to implement as part of I-SEM.  
This may include but are not limited to; 
 Undertaking a more comprehensive stakeholder survey to assess the 
motivation behind current trading strategies and the resistance or 
willingness to engage in arbitrage trading. 
 Updating the EirGrid Analysis based the recommendations regarding 
assumptions in sections 6.4.1 
 Utilisation of Plexos to assess interconnector flows in response to more 
accurate estimations of price differentials between GB and the SEM. 
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Appendix  A  : Registered Interconnector Units as of 05/07/2014 
Associated Account Unit ID Unit Name Unit Type 
IA_NIMOYLE_Interconnector Administrator IA_NIMOYLE_I_NIMOYLE Moyle Interconnector Error Unit 
Interconnector Error 
Unit 
IA_RIEWIC_EirGrid PLC_Interconnector Administrator IA_RIEWIC_I_RIEWIC EWIC Interconnector Error Unit   
Interconnector Error 
Unit 
IA_NIMOYLE_Interconnector Administrator IA_NIMOYLE_I_NIMOYLE_IRCU 
Moyle Interconnector Residual Capacity 
Unit  
Interconnector Residual 
Capacity Unit 
TSO_EIRGRID IA_RIEWIC_I_RIEWIC_IRCU 
EWIC Interconnector Residual Capacity 
Unit 
Interconnector Residual 
Capacity Unit 
PT_400021_Airtricity Ltd (Generation) PT_400021_I_RIEWIC Airtricity Limited Interconnector Unit 
PT_500021_Airtricity Energy Supply NI Ltd Generation  PT_500021_I_NIMOYLE Interconnector Unit Interconnector Unit 
PT_400099_Bord Gáis PT_400099_I_RIEWIC Bord Gáis Interconnector Unit 
PT_500037_Bord Gais Interconnector (NI) PT_500037_I_NIMOYLE Interconnector Unit Interconnector Unit 
PT_500024_Coolkeeragh ESB Ltd (Generator)  PT_500024_I_NIMOYLE Interconnector Unit Interconnector Unit 
PT_400030_ESB PGEN PT_400030_I_RIEWIC ESB PGEN EWIC Interconnector Unit 
PT_500026_ESB Independent Energy NI 
Interconnector PT_500026_I_NIMOYLE Interconnector Unit  Interconnector Unit 
PT_500027_NIE Power Procurement Business PT_500027_I_NIMOYLE Interconnector Unit Interconnector Unit 
PT_500034_NIE Supply Generation PT_500034_I_NIMOYLE Interconnector Unit Interconnector Unit 
PT_500031_Viridian Energy Supply Ltd PT_500031_I_NIMOYLE Interconnector Unit Interconnector Unit 
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PT_400115_Viridian Energy Supply Limited PT_400115_I_RIEWIC Viridian Eeergy Supply Limited - EWIC Interconnector Unit 
PT_500042_Scottish Power Energy Management Ltd PT_500042_I_NIMOYLE Scottish Power Energy Management Ltd Interconnector Unit 
PT_500051_SSE Generation Ireland Limited - 
Interconnector PT_500051_I_NIMOYLE Endessa Interconnector Unit Interconnector Unit 
PT_500072_SSE Generation Ireland Limited - 
Interconnector PT_500072_I_NIMOYLE 
SSE Generation Ireland Limited - 
Interconnector Unit Interconnector Unit 
PT_400096_ElectroRoute Energy Trading  PT_400096_I_RIEWIC ElectroRoute Energy Trading  Interconnector Unit 
PT_500059_ElectroRoute Energy Trading PT_500059_I_NIMOYLE ElectroRoute Energy Trading Ltd Interconnector Unit 
PT_500069_ElectroRoute Energy Trading   PT_500069_I_NIMOYLE ElectroRoute Energy Trading Ltd Interconnector Unit 
PT_400113_RWE Supply & Trading GmbH   PT_400113_I_RIEWIC RWE Supply & Trading GmbH Interconnector Unit 
PT_500058_RWE Supply and Trading GmbH PT_500058_I_NIMOYLE RWE Supply & Trading GmbH Interconnector Unit 
PT_400114_Endesa Generación  PT_400114_I_RIEWIC Endesa Generación EWIC Interconnector Unit 
PT_500071_Endesa Generación PT_500071_I_NIMOYLE Endesa Generación MOYLE Interconnector Unit 
PT_400108_Danske Commodities A/S PT_400108_I_RIEWIC Danske Commodities A/S   Interconnector Unit 
PT_500070_Danske Commodities A/S  PT_500070_I_NIMOYLE Danske Commodities A/S   Interconnector Unit 
PT_400136_Cenergise Limited PT_400136_I_RIEWIC Cenergise Limited - EWIC  Interconnector Unit 
PT_500075_Cenergise Limited PT_500075_I_NIMOYLE Cenergise Ltd MOYLE Interconnector Unit 
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Appendix  B  : Overview of I-SEM Options, Source (SEM 
Committee, 2014) 
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Appendix  C  : Thesis Aims, Objectives and Methodology 
Aims Objectives Methodology 
1. Examine interconnector 
flows between the SEM/All-
island (AI) and BETTA markets 
1a. Collect, organise 
and analyse SEMO 
Interconnector Flow 
Data to identify trends 
in volumes and 
direction over time and 
by type of trade. 
1a i. All Island System Load, Wind Generation, Interconnector Flow, APX 
RPD and SMP data for June 2014 were graphed over time using a pivot 
chart and analysed. 
1a ii. MIUN data for one full year (June 2013 – June 2014) was compiled 
and cumulative flows for each gate window in both the SEM to BETTA 
and BETTA to SEM direction were calculated. The results were presented 
in tabular, pie chart and bar chart form to illustrate clearly the overall 
distribution and trends emerging over time. 
1b. Identify trading 
patterns and strategies 
of Interconnector Users 
1b i. Each MIUN value was matched with its associated Interconnector 
User. This was achieved by comparing Unit ID columns in the MIUN data 
set with those in the Registered Units dataset and employing a Vlookup. 
Using the filtering feature available in excel Pivot Tables, the Modified 
Interconnector Unit Nomination (MIUN) data for each Interconnector 
User over the full year could be presented separately allowing trading 
patterns to be identified. 
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2. Determine  whether the 
actual utilisation of the 
interconnectors; corresponds 
with pre-interconnector 
delivery projections;  
2a. Compare findings 
with assumptions 
underpinning previous 
studies. 
2a i. Compare results with findings from literature review. 
 
2b. Assess whether 
EWIC is reducing SMP 
2b i. A simplified analysis was designed to compare the estimated cost of 
net energy imports for June 2014 with the theoretical amount it would 
have cost us to produce this energy at home were the interconnectors 
not available. 
2b ii. The margin of error for EirGrid’s 2014 analysis was estimated by 
examining the assumptions and determining their accuracy via literature 
review and interviews with market participants. 
2c. Assess whether 
EWIC is helping us to 
achieve renewable 
targets 
2c i. Using findings from the analysis of Interconnector User behaviour, 
responsiveness to wind could be determined. 
The impact of TSO counter trades was determined by comparing  TSO 
counter flows with wind data 
3. Consider the reasons for any 
variances that have arisen 
under the current SEM market 
3a. Analyse results and 
determine whether 
there is a connection 
between the difference 
3a i. Compare results with findings from literature review. 
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arrangements and what 
lessons can be provided in 
terms of developing the 
revised I-SEM market 
in assumed trading 
patterns and the 
differences in results. 
  
 
